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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF GROUP IDENTITY ON MEMORIES OF PAST CONFLICTS

SEPTEMBER 2009

REZARTA BILALI,
M.A.,
Ph.D.,

B.A.,

BOGAZi0 UNIVERSITY

SABANCI UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Linda R. Tropp and Nilanjana Dasgupta

The present research examined how group members construe events of conflict and
violence in which their ingroup

was involved and shed

light

on the relationship between

ingroup identification and those construals of intergroup conflict.
construals of intergroup conflict vary along

two main dimensions,

responsibility and perceived severity of harm.

survey studies,

I

Drawing on

I

proposed that
attributions of

social identity theory, in three

derived and tested hypotheses regarding cross-group and within-group

variations in these dimensions.

The

first

study examined the influence of ingroup

identification (identification with Turkish nationality)

historical period characterized

on individuals' construals of a

by intergroup violence (Armenian-Turkish

conflict).

Study

2 sought to extend this investigation in a different conflict context (Turkish-Kurdish

conflict)

by examining construals of a recent

lifetime. Furthermore,

it

conflict

which occurred during respondents'

examined whether the influence of ingroup

construals of conflict varies as a function of one's group

identification

membership (Turks

on

vs. Kurds).

Study 3 extended the prior findings to examine whether individual differences in the

viii

strength of ingroup (Hutu vs. Tutsi) identification are an important predictor of construals

of conflict

in a context

of ongoing extreme violence between groups (ethnic conflict in

Burundi).
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
Perceptions of history and collective memories have an important role in

maintaining and exacerbating intergroup conflicts

Devine- Wright, 2001). Each side

development of the

conflict,

in a conflict

which

in turn

(e.g.,

Asmal, Asmal,

& Roberts,

1996;

has a different construal of the origins and

have a very strong impact on group members'

current perceptions of the conflict and prospects for

its

resolution. Different historical

accounts of conflict serve the needs of each group (Cairns

& Roe, 2003) by justifying

outbreaks of violence and delegitimizing the opponent (Bar-Tal, 2003). In addition,
historical events

have been a powerful tool of manipulation by leaders and

collective action including revenge

1983; Ramanathapillai, 2006).

As

and other forms of aggression

elites to justify

(Berlin, 1979;

Mack,

such, perceptions of past conflict inform understanding

of the present as well as expectations for the future. Consequently, understanding
groups construe events of the past

is

how

very important for understanding the dynamics of an

intergroup conflict, and promises to shed light on conditions that

may promote

de-

escalation and perhaps even resolution.

In recent years social psychologists

have become interested

people's perceptions of their groups' or nations' troubled histories

Doosje, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears,

& Manstead,

in the study

(e.g.,

Branscombe

Devine- Wright

& Lyons,

1997; Sahdra

(e.g.,

Cairns

& Lewis,

their in-

1999;

& Ross, 2007), there has been little research

attempting to predict which psychological factors modulate individuals' construal of

1

&

1998). This research has

examined people's reactions toward descriptions of historical events involving
group's wrong-doing. However, with a few exceptions

of

historical events.

What

are the specific

between groups?

When

are they

they

make

for past incidents

How do they perceive harm

more prone

where

perpetrated vs.

way people

in

which individuals (mis)construe

to biases in construals?

their ingroup

research questions have not received

investigate because the

ways

much

was

What

conflicts

attributions

do

either the perpetrator or the victim?

harm suffered by

their

group? These types of

empirical attention; yet they are important to

construe past group conflicts

is

likely to influence

intergroup relations in the present including people's support for current policies toward

relevant outgroups (Liu, Wilson,

McLure,

& Higgins,

1999).

Using social identity theory as the guiding framework, the current research seeks
to address this

gap

in this research literature

by examining the conditions under which

intergroup conflicts are differentially construed by social groups. Three questions drive

this research. First,

how do group members

involving their ingroup?

To

construe violent intergroup conflicts

address this question,

I

examine three dimensions

in

which

construals of past conflicts vary, namely, attributions of responsibility, perceived severity

of harm, and conflict framing. Second, does the degree of ingroup identification influence
individuals' interpretations of these conflicts? Third,

what

is

the role of different types of

ingroup identification (ethnic vs. national) in these construals?

1.1

Construals of Historical Events Related to Group Conflict

Various academic disciplines such as sociology, anthropology or history study

remembering and forgetting

common

in society.

Most of these approaches focus on

the shared or

representations of collective events. Although they investigate similar

phenomena, they use

different

names including

"collective representations" (Durkheim,

1912/1947), "collective memories" (Halbwachs, 1950/1980), or "social memories"

2

(Bartlett,

1932/1950). "Collective

word "memory"
individuals

'

in

memory"

is

different

psychological research. Whereas

from the conventional use of the

memory

in

psychology refers

to

recollections of past events that they have experienced personally (or at least

think they have experienced), collective

memory

refers to interpretations or construals

of

past group or societal events that individuals self-report without necessarily having

personally experienced those events. In the present research
interpretations

actual personal

I

will be referring to

and construals of collective events such as intergroup

conflict rather than

memories of events.

Construals of collective events can be the result of a combination of personal

experiences and societal influence such as media accounts, commemorations, history

books and other social constructions (Bar-Tal, 2000; Schumann, Akiyama,
1999).

Depending on

political

& Knauper,

and ideological circumstances of the society of which they

are part (e.g., Butler, 1989; Ascherson, 1995; Schudson, 1995), people have

regarding the information to which they attend although this choice

(Sahdra

maybe

some choice

constrained

& Ross, 2007). Factors such as the freedom of information (Schudson,

1995), the

degree of disagreement about different interpretations of the past, the number of

competing claims upon the

past,

and the structure of society

(liberal versus authoritarian)

(Ascherson, 1995) are external factors that constrain individuals' construal of historical
events of their group's past.
Social scientists have investigated the shared or collective representations of

group conflict by studying

common

narratives, social accounts, historical books,

and

media. The narratives and societal beliefs of the past develop over time and provide a
coherent view of the origins and development of the conflict (Devine- Wright, 2003).
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Collective

memory of a

distorted such that

While

is

conflict has

some

basis in the actual events, but

it

biased and

serves the group's or society's needs at the present (Bar-Tal, 2007).

writing of history

at the societal level the

is

a political decision based on group's

needs and interests or an intellectual endeavor in academia (Blight, 2001;
Irwin-Zarecka, 1994; Schudson, 1995; Olick

does the 'remembering'

members

is

(Bartlett, 1932).

& Robbins,

1998),

is

it

1994;

Gillis,

the individual

who

Despite the shared nature of these beliefs, group

often exhibit differences in their interpretations of past collective events of

intergroup conflict. Understanding the conditions and processes that lead to differential
interpretations of the past across

and within groups

is

important as

it

might provide

insights for successful interventions.

1.2

The Role of Group Membership and Ingroup

Identification

on Construals of

Conflict

Bartlett (1932)

was

the

first to

suggest that there

is

a relationship between group

membership and remembering. Research on group processes and intergroup
demonstrated that categorizing oneself as a group
(Brewer, 1979). For instance,

member

relations has

leads to ingroup favoritism

Howard and Rothbart (1980) found

that categorizing

participants into arbitrary groups (overestimators vs. underestimators) influenced

memories of the ingroup 's and outgroup's behavior.

members
led

them

to

to

engage

in

Participants expected ingroup

more favorable behaviors than outgroup members, which

in turn

remember more favorable behaviors and fewer unfavorable behaviors when

these behaviors were associated with ingroup rather than outgroup members. Consistent

with laboratory research on group memories, a few studies with groups in real world
contexts found similar patterns regarding construals and interpretations of the ingroup 's

4

conflictual past. For example, Liu et

Pakehas

in

New Zealand)

al.

(1999) examined

how

ethnic groups (Maoris and

in conflict construe historical events. Free recall

important historical events in

New Zealand's history,

of the most

individuals' attributions about

important events, and evaluation of the consequences of these events were assessed for

both groups. Results demonstrated that participants showed ingroup favoritism in
perceptions of history, both in terms of which events were recalled as most important, as
well as in their construal of these events (Liu et

al.,

1999). These results are consistent

with social identity theory's claims that group members strive to maintain a positive

& Turner,

social identity (Tajfel

in recalling the group's past

and

1986), and therefore

historical events

make ingroup-serving

(Doosje

attributions

& Branscombe, 2003). Along

these lines, Baumeister and Hastings (1997) argue that the drive to maintain a positive

self-image leads to errors and distortions of events of the past that portray the in-group

positively,

whereas errors

that portray the in-group negatively are rare.

The above mentioned research has focused on
membership

in a social

the

ways

in

which mere

group influences construals of group-related events. However,

it

has not examined whether individual differences in the strength of ingroup identification,
rather than objective group

membership,

is

an important explanatory variable accounting

for additional variation in construals of past intergroup conflicts.

identity theory, not all

whom

group identity

group members are equally attached

is

According

to social

to their group; individuals to

important ought to be more motivated to maintain a positive

image of their group, which

in turn should lead to endorsing

memories of the past (Sahdra

& Ross, 2007). Based on this,

identification will be related to

how

more ingroup favorable
it is

expected that ingroup

one's ingroup 's violent conflictual past
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is

construed

and interpreted. So

far,

only two published articles have examined variants of this issue,

but each has a drawback. Liu et

al.

(1999) assessed

how

historical events

(i.e.,

attribution

of responsibility; the extent of negative consequences) were construed by members of

two groups (Pakeha and Maori

respectively);

however they did not measure

the strength

of participants' ingroup identification. Sahdra and Ross (2007) investigated the
relationship

between the strength of ingroup identification and recollections of intergroup
frequency of past events recalled freely; emotional reactions toward such

conflict

(i.e.,

events).

However, they did not examine how those events were construed by members of

both groups in conflict to

membership
this

test for differences in construal as

as well as strength of ingroup identification.

a function of group

The

current research aims to

gap by investigating whether members of different groups who also vary

identification will construe

and

in

fill

ingroup

interpret violent intergroup conflict differently. In support

of this idea, past research found that people are driven to maintain a positive group
image, therefore group members are generally expected to

make more

errors in recalling

events that portray the ingroup positively and fewer errors in recalling events that portray
the ingroup negatively (Baumeister

1.3

What Are
From

the

Hastings, 1997).

Dimensions along which Construals of Intergroup Conflict Vary?

a social psychological perspective, sources such as selective attention,

fabrication, exaggeration,

& Hastings,

&

1997)

may be

blaming the enemy, or blaming the circumstances (Baumeister
useful to understand

how group members

construe events of

group's past differently. For example, research on people's reactions toward ingroup's

wrongdoing has demonstrated
inflicted

(Branscombe

that people often

minimize the severity of the harm

& Miron, 2004), blame or make situational attributions (rather
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than ingroup attributions) to explain the negative actions (Doosje

or place responsibility for the

1992). In a similar vein,

harm done on

individuals accept and justify violence and

mechanisms

related

Branscombe, 2003),

& Dunkel-Schetter,

the victims (Herbert

Bandura (1999, 2002) describes

&

mechanisms by which

inhumane conduct on

others.

These

include: (1) moral justification of the act, (2) denial, displacement, or

diffusion of responsibility, (3) disregarding or minimizing the negative consequences,

and (4) attribution of blame

to the victim or circumstances.

developed to describe processes

shown

to

at

Although originally

the individual level, these

mechanisms have been

be applicable to group members' judgments about their group's conduct

situations of

Moschner,

war and

military interventions (see Cohrs

& Kielman, 2003; Grussendorf, McAlister,

in

& Moschner, 2002; Cohrs, Maes,
& Morrison,

Sandstroem, Udd,

2002). Variation in the use of these strategies might account for differential
interpretations of the ingroup 's conflictual past.

Taken

together, these strategies vary

along two dimensions: attributions of responsibility for the harm inflicted

(e.g.,

blaming

the victim or the circumstances, denial of or displacement of responsibility), and

perceived severity of harm

harmdoing).

I

(e.g.,

elaborate on these

1.3.1 Attributions

minimization of the negative consequences of ingroup's

two dimensions below.

of responsibility

Based on the mechanisms

identified

by Bandura (1999) and Baumeister and

Hastings (1997) three targets of attributions can be readily identified in intergroup
contexts: the ingroup, the outgroup, and the situational factors

(i.e.,

third parties or

circumstances). In this context, ingroup favoritism hypothesis postulates that group

members would make fewer ingroup

attributions, but
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more outgroup and

external

attributions for the conflict. Situational attributions can serve as mitigating factors that

tone

down

the responsibility for ingroup's

&

harmdoing (Bandura, 1999; Baumeister

Hastings, 1997).

Research on attributions of responsibility

at the

intergroup level has primarily

focused on the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979) which suggests that group

members make

situational attributions for negative acts carried out

member, but they make
an outgroup

member

by an ingroup

dispositional attributions if these negative acts are carried out

(e.g.,

Duncan, 1976, Hewstone

& Ward,

1985, Rosenberg

Wolfsfeld, 1977, Stephan, 1977). In these studies an ingroup or outgroup

by

&

member

is

generally depicted as responsible for a negative or a positive behavior, therefore the

question

is

not

who

is

responsible for the behavior, but whether the behavior

to dispositional or situational influences.

who

The emphasis

is

is

attributed

on evaluating the individual

carried out the negative behavior, rather than on construing the event. Additionally,

with few exceptions

examined

(e.g.

Doosje

& Branscombe, 2003), studies in this area have

attributions for a specific behavior of a specific

outgroup, rather than global attributions
a whole.

As

attributions

made

member of the

for the negative behavior

ingroup or

of the ingroup as

such, despite this literature on intergroup attributions, our understanding of

of responsibility

in intergroup conflict contexts

remains limited.

Threat, fear, and delegitimization of the other in a violent conflict increases

perceptions of the adversary as extremely threatening (Bar-Tal, 2007). Groups sometimes

engage

in defensive violence or

preemptive strikes to protect themselves from the

outgroup (Staub, 1998). These violent actions by the ingroup might be perceived merely
as a response to the outgroup's provocation (Bandura, 1990; Staub, 1989). Research on
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interpersonal conflict

(Brown

intergroup conflict (Dodge

& Tedeschi,

& Coie,

1987;

retaliation in response to provocation

individual or the group that

is

1976; Kane, Joseph,

Wohl

&

the violent acts, the ingroup' s positive

image

real) is

if the

is

1976) and

Reeder, 2004) has demonstrated that

(imagined or

provoked. Even

& Tedeschi,

considered as justifiable by the

ingroup

is

viewed

as responsible for

not threatened if these acts were

perceived to be in response to the outgroup's negative behavior (Branscombe

& Miron,

2004). Intractable intergroup conflicts are generally characterized by cycles of violence in

which each group harms the other

Each group views

at different

times during the course of the conflict.

their violent actions as legitimate while

blaming the other group for

provoking the violence.

Based on

this,

I

propose a distinction between two types of responsibility

in

intergroup conflict contexts: assigning responsibility for the instigation versus assigning
responsibility for the consequences of conflict.

starting or

provoking the events, whereas the

The

refers to responsibility for

first

latter refers to responsibility for

out the harmdoing in the course of the conflict, thus inflicting
sides have

harmed each other

in the conflict,

each group

is

harm and

carrying

suffering. If both

likely to perceive their acts

of

violence as a response to threat or provocation by the outgroup. Perceiving the ingroup as
less responsible for instigating the conflict

and perceiving the outgroup as the

of the conflict should provide moral justification for ingroup's violent
groups might engage in competition about 'who started

it first.'

acts.

instigator

Therefore,

This motivation to reduce

one's responsibility for the instigation of the events might manifest in individuals
perceiving their ingroup as less responsible for instigating a conflict than for
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its

consequences, and

it

might also lead

instigating the conflict than for

its

to perceiving the

outgroup as more responsible for

consequences.

of Harm

1.3.2 Severity

Ingroup suffering and victimization are central to group members' beliefs about
conflicts in

which

their

groups are involved (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007). Each group

conflict portrays itself as the victim

&

(Nadler

and focuses on

Saguy, 2004; Noor, Brown,

might serve

its

own

& Prentice, 2008).

to legitimize current negative actions against

Branscombe, 2008) as well as

in a

suffering and victimhood

Portraying oneself as a victim

outgroup members (Wohl

to establish the ingroup's morality

&

and legitimacy for past

negative acts. At the societal level, groups attempt in various ways to minimize the harm

inflicted

by

their ingroup.

order to diminish the

officially

research

For instance, Pratto and Glasford (2008) have noted that

harm done,

institutionally or collectively,

in

sometimes groups do not

and accurately count the war victims who are considered the enemy. Media

(e.g.,

Fishman

& Marvin, 2003) has shown that representations of the suffering

are highly biased to favor the ingroup, in terms of exclusively focusing

on the suffering

experienced by the ingroup and downplaying the suffering experienced by the outgroup.
Similarly, at an individual level,

Bandura (1999) has found

the consequences of their negative acts, or disregard

that people tend to

minimize

and discredit relevant evidence

to

the contrary.

Some

research on intergroup conflict has examined beliefs about the ingroup's

victimhood (Bar-Tal, 2000) and

their effects

on various intergroup outcomes (Vollhardt,

2009). However, the extent of harm individuals perceive to be inflicted on the ingroup vs.

outgroup, and within-group variations in these perceptions have not been investigated.
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From

a social identity perspective, the motivation to perceive one's ingroup in a positive

light is

expected to create individual differences in perceived severity of harm inflicted

on the ingroup and the outgroup. The desire

to portray the

ingroup as the victim, that

is,

to gain legitimacy in the conflict,

might lead group members to exclusively focus on the

harm

to

inflicted

on the ingroup and

downplay

the

harm

inflicted

such, a stronger ingroup identification should encourage group

harm
1

.

1

inflicted

on the ingroup but

less

harm

inflicted

on the outgroup. As

members

to perceive

more

on the outgroup.

The Goals of the Present Research
The present research aimed

to investigate

how group members

intergroup conflict and violence in which their ingroup

construe events of

was involved. As

identified

above, two dimensions that contribute to differential construals of intergroup conflict
include attributions of responsibility and perceived severity of harm. This research

investigates these construals

these

by examining cross-group and within-group variations

two dimensions. Based on predictions derived from

postulated that groups

responsibility

effects

would generally

social identity theory,

it

in

was

exhibit ingroup favoring biases in attributions of

and perceived severity of harm. In addition,

would be enhanced by individual differences

it

was expected

in the strength

that these

of ingroup

identification.

These issues were investigated
(1) the Turkish- Armenian conflict

in three different contexts

of intergroup conflicts:

and mass killings between 1880s- 1920s,

(2) the

Turkish-Kurdish conflict in Turkey between 1984 to 2005, and (3) the ongoing ethnic
conflict

between Hutus and Tutsis

vary along

in

at least three theoretically

Burundi since 1962. The above-mentioned conflicts
important dimensions; thus, similar findings across
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these conflicts promise to be strong evidence for the generalizability of

The dimensions
whether

it

is

in

which these contexts vary include:

my

predictions.

(1) temporal distance, specifically

a past (historical) conflict vs. recent conflict that occurred during

respondents' lifetime; (2) the current stage of the conflict, that

ongoing or whether

it

is,

whether the violence

is

has diminished; and (3) the degree of violence over the course of

the conflict, such as maskillings or genocidal acts versus less extreme forms of violence.

Furthermore, these conflict contexts cover a range of issues including minority rights

(Kurdish minority

in

Turkey), terrorism (acts of terror in the context of Turkish-Kurdish

conflict), ethnic clashes

(between Hutus and Tutsis

(Turkish-Armenian violence and genocidal acts
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in Burundi),

in Burundi).

and genocidal violence

CHAPTER 2

STUDY

TURKISH-ARMENIAN CONFLICT

1:

2.1 Introduction

The goal of the
historical period

first

was

study

to

examine how group members construe a

of intergroup conflict and violence, and whether variations

in the

strength of ingroup identification predict these construals. Specifically, in this study,

construals include attributions of responsibility and perceived severity of harm inflicted

by the ingroup and the outgroup on each

other.

Two

dimensions of attributions were

examined: the target group to which responsibility was attributed (ingroup
vs. external factors)

issues

and the type responsibility

were examined

in the context

vs.

(instigation vs. consequences).

outgroup

These

of Turkish- Armenian conflict by investigating

Turks' construal of events related to the mass-killings of Armenians in the period

between 1880 - 1920. Armenians
1915, as the

first

refer to the massacres during this period, particularly in

genocide of the century, while Turks refer to the same event as

communal warfare (Lewy, 2005,

p. ix).

The Turkish governments

denied a genocide of Armenians by Turks (Jorgensen, 2003,

genocide
2.1.1

still

since 1923 have firmly

p. 193).

Turks and Armenians about whether the massacres of Armenians

inter-

in

Disputes between

1915 amount to

continue.

The Context of Turkish- Armenian Conflict
Before the break of the

current Turkey, had been losing

Word War
its

I,

European

the

Ottoman Empire,

territories in the

the predecessor of

Balkan Wars of 191

1913, and had lost parts of Eastern Anatolia to Russia during the Turco-Russian
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1-

war of

and early 20

1877-1878 (Jorgensen, 2003). Late 19

century marked the disintegration

of the Ottoman empire and the establishment of Young Turks' regime

in

1908 which

sought to reform, modernize, and to 'turkify' the Ottoman state into a mono-ethnic

Turkish national state (Hovannissian, 1997,

p. 27).

Armenians inhabited

Anatolia, and like other

non-Muslim populations, were considered

so-called millets, in the

Ottoman empire. Between 1880 -1920

parts of Eastern

a minority group, the

there

were several

massacres of Armenians, including the massacres of about 100,000 Armenians between
1895 - 1896, culminating

in the

mass

killing

context in which these events occurred

disintegration,

from third

and deportation of Armenians

was one

in

The

in 1915.

which the Ottoman empire feared

and was faced with rising nationalism of Christian minorities, interference

parties,

and national defeat

Scholars of Armenian origin

(e.g.,

in the

Balkan wars

in

1913 (Akcam, 2006).

Dadrian, 2003; Hovannisian, 1997) and most

international sources (Melson, 1992; Nazer, 1968; Staub, 1989) claim that

more than a

million Armenians perished as a result of direct and unprovoked massacres by the

Turkish military or during deportations which intended to exterminate Armenians of the

Ottoman empire.
2. 1.2

Characteristics of Turkish Narrative of the Events of 1915

Turkish

state narrative asserts that

movement, sided with the enemy

(the Russians) during the

attacked and terrorized the Turkish

the

Armenians, engaged

Muslim

in a nationalist

Turco-Russian war, and

population. According to this narrative,

it

was

Armenians who had carried out massacres toward Turks, and consequently, the

decision of the

Young Turk regime

taken to protect the innocent

to deport the

Armenians was an extreme measure

Muslim population from
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attacks

by Armenians and protect

territories (Jorgensen,

2003; see also Uras, 1988, for the Turkish arguments to the

'Armenian Question'). According

Armenians died

to official

Turkish

statistics

as a result of direct fighting

and due

to starvation during the deportations

300,000

to

(Lewy, 2005), and about 150,000 Turks were killed by Armenians during

600,000

that period

(Staub, 1989).

Since 1920s until recently there has been a silence and a national consensus on the

Armenian

issue in

Turkey (Necef, 2003). However, with the international attention

these events have received in the recent decade, and with the increasing interest in

debate within Turkey heated up (Necef, 2003,

rights, the

p. 228).

Necef (2003)

the positions of the Turkish intellectuals and political debaters in four

characterize the events of 1915 as a tragic civil

harmed each

"we

other, but

Armenians suffered

are the real victims" group

emphasize

how much

finally (4) a

group

who do

war

in

feel

range of explanations that

acts

were

who

which Turks and Armenians

not recognize Armenians' suffering but

of Armenians as necessary and about

remorseful or apologetic (Necef, 2003,

Overall, the interpretations of this period of history

Armenians

(1) a

to a greater extent than Turks, (3) the largest

that portrays the deportations

responsibility.

classified

Turks and Muslim populations suffered attacks by Armenians, and

which Turks should not

deny

human

main groups:

small group of "genocide recognizers" (2) a larger "mutual killings" group

that

may

p. 230).

by Turks include a whole

be interpreted as psychological justification to deflect or

These explanations include justifications such as

(for treason or for attacking

in self-defense (protection

Muslim

from

(a)

blaming

populations); (b) claiming that violent

territorial loss

and/or protection of the Turkish

population that was being targeted by Armenian banditry); (c) shifting responsibility to

15

external factors and third parties (claiming that

Armenian deaths were

a result of Kurdish

attacks or starvation); (d) claiming benevolent motivations behind the deportations of

Armenians (evacuation from war zones);

(e)

minimizing harm (arguing

that the

number

of victims was lower than what has been claimed by Armenians or comparing the number
of Armenian losses with Turkish losses during World

War

I);

or

(f)

denial of massacres

altogether (see Turkozu, 1986). In sum, the Turkish narrative of this conflict includes the

whole range of the justification

strategies

making

it

a unique context in

investigate variations in attributions of responsibility and perceived

There has been no research up to

harm

now to examine how ordinary

rather than political debaters or historians, construe violence toward

which

to

suffered.

Turkish people,

Armenians between

1880s to 1920s. Given the Turkish government's narrative, censorship, and denial of any
allegations of genocide, the following questions arise:

these past events?

in

To what degree do

they endorse the state's narrative?

Turks' interpretations of the events?

to explain these historical events?

How do Turkish people

What kind of justification

Most importantly, do

Is

construe

there variation

strategies

do people use

individual differences such as the

strength of Turkish identification influence these construals?

The

current study sought to

examine these questions.
Specific hypotheses for this study are

summarized below:

2.2 Hypotheses

2.2.1

Whom Do Turks Hold Responsible for the Conflict?
I

measured two types of attributions of responsibility:

(a) the extent to

which

ingroup, outgroup, or external factors were held responsible for the conflict; and (b)
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the

whether each of the above-mentioned targets were held responsible for the instigation of
the conflict vs. for

HI:

I

its

negative consequences.

predicted a main effect of Target group such that overall, Turkish

respondents would perceive their ingroup (Turks) as less responsible compared to the

outgroup (Armenians) and also compared

to external factors (third parties

and

situational

factors)

H2:

I

predicted an interaction effect of Target group x

that Turkish respondents

would perceive

instigating the conflict than for

its

Type of responsibility, such

the ingroup (Turks) as less responsible for

consequences (H2a). However, they would perceive

the outgroup (Armenians) (H2b) and external factors (e.g. third parties) (H2c) as

more

responsible for instigating the negative events than for the consequences.

2.2.2

Who Do Turks Believe
H3:

I

Suffered

Due

to the Conflict?

predicted that Turkish respondents would perceive the

harm

inflicted

on the

outgroup (Armenians) by their ingroup (Turks) to be lower than the harm inflicted on the
ingroup (Turks) by the outgroup (Armenians).
2.2.3

How Does Ingroup

Identification Influence Turks' Construals of the

Conflict?

Stronger Turkish identification was predicted to enhance ingroup favoritism
participants

make

historical events.

attributions of responsibility

Specifically,

I

when

and assess severity of harm for these

predicted that:

H4: Stronger Turkish identification should be associated with attributing more
responsibility to the outgroup

(i.e.,

more

responsibility to

factors (e.g., third parties) for the conflict,

Armenians) and

and by comparison,

17

to external

less responsibility to the

ingroup for the conflict

(i.e.,

less responsibility to Turks).

These

across the two types of responsibility measured in this study

effects should be similar

(i.e.,

instigation

and

consequences of conflict).
H5: Stronger Turkish identification will be associated with more harm perceived
to

be inflicted by the outgroup (Armenians) on the ingroup (Turks) (H5a), and

to

be inflicted by the ingroup (Turks) on the outgroup (H5b).

2.3

less

harm

Methods

2.3.1 Participants

Participants

were 113 Turkish students (42 females, 50 males, 21 participants did

not report their gender). All participants were Turkish citizens and recruited from the

Turkish foreign student population
Participants

were contacted via email

through snowball sampling
U.

at

S. universities.

at

various universities in the United States.

of Turkish foreign student associations and

lists

various

All participants completed a survey instrument online.

The

description

of the goals of the study and the link to the online survey was sent to participants via
email. Participants'

USD

names were entered

into a lottery in

100 were awarded for participation
Participants' ages ranged

Overall, respondents

SD =

5.57),

5.23,

SD =

and

from 22

participants described themselves as

coming from

a

to

had lived most of their

The sample represents

49 years old
lives in

as

of

(M= 29.38, SD = 4.93).

Turkey (years

in

Turkey:

M= 23.04,

United States (years in the United States:

different

coming from

low income, and 10%

gift certificates

in the research.

in recent years lived in the

5.02).

which four

socioeconomic backgrounds:
a middle

income family, 16%

coming from a high income family.

18

74%
as

M=
of

The study was introduced

as a survey investigating views of historical events

involving intergroup violence. Participants were told that they would be asked questions

about a period of intergroup violence experienced by their ingroup, specifically the
Turkish- Armenian conflict between 1880s

2.3.2

-

1920s.

Measures and Procedures

The survey instrument

constituted of three sections:

The

first

section included

items assessing participants' ingroup (national) identification; a second section included
items assessing participants' construal of the past conflict between Armenians and Turks

between 1880s - 1920s, and a
socio-economic

status). All

third section included

demographic questions (age, gender,

surveys were administered in Turkish.

translators translated the survey to Turkish.

Any

by discussions among the researcher and the

Two

independent

disagreements in wording were solved

translators. In addition, a pilot test

was

conducted with a number of participants from the participant pool.
After completing the

were asked
conflict

to write

down

first

in as

section on ingroup (Turkish) identification, participants

much

detail as possible a description

between Turks and Armenians

in the period

purpose was to have participants reflect on

this

of the violent

between 1880s and 1920s. The

period of history prior to responding to

subsequent close-ended items. Afterwards, a series of close-ended questions assessed
participants' construals of the Turkish

-Armenian with

genocide of Armenians occurred. Here,

I

measured

( 1 )

a specific focus

on 1915 when

attribution of responsibility to the

ingroup, outgroup, and external factors (third-parties, situational causes), and (2)

perceived severity of harm inflicted on the ingroup vs. outgroup.
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the

2.3.2.1 Attribution

Two

of Responsibility

items assessed attributions of responsibility for each of three target groups:

the ingroup (Turks), the outgroup (Armenians),

situational factors). This included the

and external factors

amount of responsibility

each target group for instigating the violent events

( 1

item),

(third parties

participants attributed to

and the amount responsibility

they attributed to each target for the consequences of the events including the
suffering caused

( 1

item).

The items

started with a lead question:

negative consequences?". Participants responded on 7-point scales (0

= complete

damage and

"How much

responsibility does each of the following groups have for inciting the events

6

and

= no

and

for their

responsibility;

responsibility).

2.3.2.2 Severity of

Harm

Several indicators of harm were used to assess the perceived

harm

inflicted

each group (1) during the whole period of conflict between 1880 -1920, and (2)

on

in 1915.

For the entire period of conflict, one item asked participants to estimate the extent
of economic harm that each group experienced due to the conflict between Turks and

Armenians. These items were assessed on 7-point scales (0
6

=

severe negative consequences).

= no

negative consequences;

The two ingroup harm items (a =

outgroup harm items (a = .77) revealed good

reliabilities

.70)

and the two

and were averaged

to

form

measures of ingroup harm and outgroup harm.
Similarly, for 1915 in particular, perceived severity of harm caused

was assessed with two items asking
killed

by Turks

villages

in 1915,

by Turks

and

(2) the

participants to estimate

number of Armenians

in 1915. Likewise, the

( 1 )

the

by the ingroup

number of Armenians

forcefully displaced

from

perceived severity of harm caused by the
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their

outgroup was assessed by asking participants

by Armenians
villages

and

in 1915,

by Armenians

(2) the

to estimate

number of Turks

( 1 )

the

number of Turks

killed

forcefully displaced from their

in 1915. Participants rated the severity

of harm using 6-point

scales consisting of the following estimate ranges: (1) less than 100,000 people killed, (2)

100,001 to 300,000, (3) 300,001 - 500,000, (4) 500,001 - 700,000, (5) 700,001 900,000, (6) more than 900,000
2.3.2.3 Ingroup identification

Ingroup identification was assessed by five items that have been used extensively
in prior research

on

social identity theory (Doosje et

Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Leach

et al.,

al.,

1998; Ellemers, Kortekaas,

2008; Luhtanen

& Crocker,

1992).

The

items were adapted to assess Turkish identification and included: (1) Being Turkish

important part of how

Turkish

and

(5)

is

I

see myself, (2)

I

am

glad to be a Turk, (3) The fact that

an important part of my identity, (4) Being Turkish gives

Being Turkish

is

me good

=

reliability (a

strongly agree).

=

.93),

is

The

(1

feelings,

=

how

strongly

five ingroup identification items revealed very

and therefore, responses were averaged

an

am

an important part of my self-image. Participants were asked

strongly they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a six point scale

disagree; 6

I

&

good

to create a single

identification score.

1

customary to have intervals of equal size, the first interval was purposely
set to be less than 200,000 based on pilot feedback and research on the conflict, showing
that the number of Turkish casualties, compared to Armenian casualties in the conflict, is

Although

it

is

believed to be very small.
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2.4 Results

2.4.

1

Who Do Turks Hold
To

vs.

Responsible for the Conflict?

assess Turks' attributions of responsibility, a 3 (Target of attribution: ingroup

outgroup

vs. external factors)

repeated measures

X

2 (Type of attribution: instigation vs. consequences)

ANOVA was conducted with target of attribution and type of

attribution as within-subject predictors.

The dependent

variable

was

the

amount of

responsibility.

As

predicted (HI), the results yielded a significant main effect of target of

attribution,

F (2, 216) = 23.26, p <

less responsibility to their

SE= .15)

and

ingroup

to external factors

.001,

2
rj

=

.18,

(M— 2.86, SE —

(M= 4.26, SE =

between the amount of responsibility attributed
(P

=

such

that,

Turks generally attributed

.15) than to the outgroup

.15) (ps

to the

(M= 3.95,

<001). There was no difference

outgroup and to the external factors

-12).

The

analysis also yielded a significant Target of attribution

responsibility interaction,

F(2, 216) = 55.59,/? < .001,

the interaction effect pair-wise

t

tests

were conducted

rj

to

2

=

X Type of

.34 (see Figure

1).

To

clarify

compare the amount of

responsibility for the instigation versus the negative consequences of the events for the

in-

and out-group separately. As expected (H2a), Turks perceived the ingroup as

responsible for instigating the events

consequences
predictions

(M=

3.50,

.16) than for

SE= .16), t (109) = -9Al,p<

(H2b and H2c),

more responsible

(M = 2.23, SE =

the outgroup

for the instigation

.001.

By

its

negative

contrast, in line with

and the external factors were perceived

(M= 4.17, SE =

.15

and

to

be

M= 4.48, SE = .15

respectively) than for the consequences of the conflict and violence
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less

(M=

3.73,

SE =

.18),

t

(1 10)

p=

=

3.65,/?

<

.001, external factors

To
tests

(M= 4.05, SE= .17), t (109) =

.

Suffered

Due

to the Conflict?

assess Turks' perceptions regarding severity of harm (H3 ), paired samples

were conducted with each indicator of harm as the dependent

compared

participants' estimates of the

the course of the conflict

casualties

and number of displaced individuals)

inflicted

inflicted

amount of harm

inflicted

(M=

5.01,

(M= 4.52, SD =

SD =

1.30),

1.29) to be

t

(93)

=

-

The analyses

(i.e.,

number of

in 1915.

For

typically perceived

more severe than

2.86,/?

/

on each group during

on each group

whole course of conflict, participants

on the outgroup

on the ingroup

inflicted

variable.

between 1880s - 1920s, and similar harm

severity of harm during the

harm

3.40,

2

Who Do Turks Believe

2.4.2

and

.001, for the outgroup target,

=

the

harm

.005. Similarly, for the

1915 events, the amount of harm inflicted on the outgroup was perceived to be greater
than the harm experienced by the ingroup. Specifically, participants estimated a higher

number of Armenian

2

Univariate

casualties

(M= 2.26, SD =

1.41);

and displaced Armenians

(M=

ANOVAs were conducted to compare the perceived differences in

and the consequences of
events. Results yielded significant differences for instigation of events such that
participants perceived ingroup 's responsibility as lower than outgroup 's responsibility or
attributions of responsibility separately for the instigation

the external factors' responsibility,
pattern (marginally significant)

consequences of events,

F (2, 216) = 58,57,/? < .001,

emerged

for attributions

F (2, 216) = 2.58,/? =
23

.08,

2
rj

=

rf

=

.35.

A similar

of responsibility for the
.02.

3.36,

(75)

SD=

=

compared

1.57)

2.48,

to the

p = .015, and of the

number of Turkish

displaced Turks

casualties

(M =

1

.57,

(M=

SD =

1.80,

SD =

1.19),/

1.1 1), t (73)

= 7.46,/?<.001. 3
2.4.3

How Does
To

test

Ingroup Identification Influence Turks' Construals of the Conflict?

Hypothesis

4, separate

identification as the predictor

variable.

Summary

results

regression analyses were conducted with ingroup

and each

from both

attribution

sets

of analyses are presented

in the table, regression analyses revealed the

effects for both types of responsibility

of responsibility as the dependent

same

in

1

.

As shown

patterns of ingroup identification

instigation of the conflict

(i.e.,

Table

and

its

consequences). Therefore, scores for the attribution of responsibility were collapsed
across the two items for each target (ingroup, outgroup, external factors).

Figure

2,

As

illustrated in

stronger Turkish identification led to attributing less responsibility to the

ingroup (Turks) for the conflict,

p=

-.56,

/

(108)

responsibility to the outgroup (Armenians),

external factors,

p=

.39,

t

(108)

=

4.37,/?

<

/?

=

=

-7.04,/?

<

.001, but

more

(109)

=

5.43,/?

<

.001,

.46,

t

and

to the

.001.

Similar to the previous analyses, to test the effect of ingroup identification,
regression analyses were conducted with Turkish identification as the predictor and each
severity of harm

measure (overall harm, economic harm, and casualty estimates) as the

dependent variable. The ingroup and the outgroup severity of harm were treated as

3

Only

69%

of the sample provided estimates for the number of casualties and displaced

were conducted to compare the
characteristics of the participants who provided estimates of harm and those who did not
provide responses. The two groups did not differ in any dimension (age, political interest,
interest in history, or in their identification as Turks) except for gender. Women were less
likely to provide estimates for the severity of harm; 75% of respondents who did not
provide an estimate were women.

people in the events of 1915. Independent samples
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t

tests

separate dependent variables.

The

results of these analyses are

summarized

in

Table

2.

As

expected (H5), for each dependent variable (number of casualties, people displaced,
overall harm), participants

harm

inflicted

on the ingroup

who

on the outgroup

(fts

=

identified

(/?s

=

more strongly with

their ingroup reported less

-.36, -.29, -.26 respectively)

and more harm

inflicted

.24, .26, .33 respectively).

2.5 Discussion

Overall, the results of Study

1

indicated that Turks believed both groups to be

responsible for the conflict and both to have suffered substantially. However, supporting
the ingroup favoritism hypothesis, Turkish respondents attributed less responsibility to

the ingroup

compared

to the

outgroup and external

factors.

notable considering the magnitude of the conflict—Turkey

genocide toward the Armenians (Lewy, 2005).

As

These
is

results are particularly

accused of committing

expected, Turks attributed less

responsibility to the ingroup for instigating the violent events than for their consequences,

whereas the Armenian outgroup and the external factors were viewed as more responsible
for the instigation of the events than for

some

its

consequences. Although Turks acknowledged

responsibility for the consequences of their ingroup 's violent acts, they perceived

these acts to be provoked

by the outgroup or

responsibility. This pattern

embedded

in

third parties, thus reducing the ingroup'

of attributions shows

how justification

group members' construals and representation of the

of harmdoing becomes
conflict.

Contradicting the ingroup favoritism hypothesis, Turks perceived more harm to

be inflicted on the Armenians than on their ingroup. As Turkey
perpetrator of genocide, perhaps this finding

be reality constraints on

how much

is

is

not so surprising

accused of being the

(i.e.,

there are likely to

individuals can minimize the perpetration of harm
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done by

their ingroup).

It

should be noted that while Turks believed that Armenians

suffered considerably, they also perceived their ingroup to have been

harmed

considerably. Turks' representations of these events are consistent with the Turkish

government
vs.

of responsibility

narrative, both with regard to attributions

(e.g., instigation

consequences) and to the amount of harm inflicted on each group. For instance, the

mean range of the

estimates of Armenian casualties (range between 100,000 to 500,000)

and Turkish casualties (between 0
statistics.

When

it is

to

300,000) in

to justify

why

the

harm was

2008). In this context, Turkish respondents

more

sample matches the government's

not feasible to deny the harm done by one's ingroup, then ingroup

members may attempt

attributing

this

responsibility to

Armenians

Most importantly, findings
as ingroup identification,

seem

inflicted

to justify

(Wohl

why

& Branscombe,

they inflicted harm by

for instigating the events.

also demonstrated that an individual level factor, such

was an important predictor of these

construals, accounting for a

substantial portion of the explained variance in attributions of responsibility

and

for perceived severity

of harm (6%

-

(10%

-

29%)

13%). Overall, stronger ingroup identification

was associated with more ingroup favoritism both

in attributions

of responsibility and

perceived severity of harm. These findings suggest that individual level differences in

group members' attachment to

their ingroup

have an important influence on

their

representations of the past and the degree to which the dominant societal narrative

endorsed. In the current context, the strength of ingroup identification

with construals of historical events. Then, the question
identification

would

is

was associated

whether the strength of ingroup

exhibit similar trends in recent conflicts
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is

which occurred during

respondents' lifetime

own

when

there

is

more opportunity

assessment of the events.
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for

group members

to

make

their

CHAPTER

3

STUDY 2: TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT
3.1 Introduction

While the

first

study examined construals of past events that occurred about one

century ago, and which are predominantly influenced by

community

narratives (e.g.,

family stories, peers' opinions) as well as government-endorsed narratives in historical
texts (e.g., history books),

Study 2 examined construals of a recent conflict that has been

continuing during participants' lifetime.

degree to which participants'

own

As

such,

it

provided more direct evidence for the

interpretations of a conflict

may

vary due to their

own

experiences with the conflict, rather than the degree to which they conform to

government or

societal narratives.

Study 2 extended Study

1

in five

important ways: (1)

it

examined

participants'

construal of recent intergroup violence that occurred during their lifetime (in the context

of Turkish-Kurdish

conflict), (2)

(Turks and Kurds), (3)

it

it

compared both groups' perspectives of the

assessed an additional dimension of participants' construals,

namely, conflict framing (see below for

details), (4)

it

moved beyond ingroup and

outgroup distinctions to assess which types of targets affiliated with the

were held responsible for the
group identification (ethnic

Below,

I

conflict

conflict,

and

(5)

it

examined the

vs. national identification)

effect

outgroup

of different types of

on construals of the

elaborate on each of these theoretical extensions.
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in- or

conflict.

3.1.1

The Context of the Conflict
Study 2 focused on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict

Kurds are the

largest ethnic minority in

in

Turkey between 1984 -2005.

Turkey constituting around

population (CIA World Factbook, 2009;

KONDA,

1

4% - 20% of the

2006). Tensions between the Kurdish

minority and the Turkish state can be traced to the beginnings of the Turkish republic. In
1925, in a massive Kurdish uprising in Eastern Anatolia, Kurds drove Turkish officials

away from

their villages in

an attempt to form their

Shumock, 2006). The uprising was

later

own

state,

Kurdistan (Husain

&

crushed by Turkish forces. The Turkish republic

forced various ethnic minority groups within the remnants of the Ottoman empire to
assimilate to a Turkish identity (Oke, 2005, p.25, Yavuz, 2001).

The Turkish

state did not

recognize the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic minority in Turkey and suppressed
collective

and public expressions of Kurdish

identity (e.g.,

banning the use of Kurdish

language, and replacing Kurdish names of towns and children with Turkish names)

(Barkey, 2000). The government's assimilation policies increased Kurds' resentment

toward the government, led to defiance of these policies by Kurdish
2007) and to a restrained

political

movement

activists (Watts,

to gain minority rights (Saatci, 2002). In

1984, the insurgent organization, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan or Kurdistan's Workers

Party (abbreviated as

PKK's aim was

PKK), launched

to establish

a violent

campaign

an independent Kurdish

in Southeast

state in the

Turkey. The

Southeastern Turkey

which would eventually include other Kurdish populated areas of the neighbor countries
(Watts, 2007). Since 1984, around 30,000 people have been killed either in attacks by the

PKK or as a result of Turkish army's military campaigns (Oke, 2005, p.
2002).

The

violent conflict diminished after the capture of the
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28; Saatci,

PKK leader in

1999, and

since then, Turkey, with pressure from the European Union, has passed a series of laws

granting cultural rights to

its

Kurdish citizens (Somer, 2004). Kurds are permitted

a variety of positions in the Turkish

government as long as they

to

hold

identify themselves as

Turks, and a large number of Kurds are assimilated in the Turkish society (Rubin, 2003).

3.1.2

A Comparison of both Groups'
Study 2 examined

how

Perspectives of the Conflict

each side

in the conflict

construed the past, thus providing

an opportunity to compare individuals' construals of the conflict as a function of their

group membership. All Turkish

citizens,

both ethnic Turks and ethnic Kurds, are likely to

have encountered the national narrative about the conflict through mainstream media
exposure. Therefore, any obtained group differences in the construal of intergroup
violence are likely to be influenced by group membership and the nature of each group's

experiences and narratives.
differential construal

It

was expected

that

group membership would predict

of the conflict, with each group trying to justify the acts of violence

committed by ingroup members. Based on ingroup favoritism predictions of social
identity theory,

I

hypothesized that participants in each group would hold mirror-image

perceptions of the violent events, such that each group would attribute
responsibility to the outgroup

and perceive more harm

inflicted

on

more

their ingroup relative

to the outgroup.

3.1.3

Who

do Turks and Kurds Hold Responsible for the Conflict?

Celik and
state, the

Blum (2007)

PKK, Turkish

identified four primary parties in this conflict: the Turkish

citizens,

and Kurdish citizens of Turkey. They identified

international actors (e.g., the U.S.

conflict (Celik

and European Union) as secondary parties

in the

& Blum, 2007). To account for this complexity, the current study moved
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beyond simple ingroup

outgroup targets by assessing the amount of responsibility

vs.

attributed to different types

conflict

(i.e.,

of actors that are perceived

the Turkish state, the

PKK,

the self-evident categories of Turks

Turks, Kurds, and third parties). In addition to

and Kurds, the Turkish

with the Turkish ethnic group, and the

From an ingroup

be potential parties in the

to

state is typically associated

PKK is associated with the

favoritism perspective,

I

Kurdish ethnic group.

predicted that Turks and Kurds

would

exhibit

different patterns of attributions of responsibility. Specifically, Turkish participants

relative to

Kurdish participants would attribute more responsibility

to the

PKK and to

Kurds, but less responsibility to the Turkish state and to Turks.
3.1.4

Do Turks and Kurds Frame
Groups

events

(i.e.,

in conflict

the Conflict Differently?

might not only exhibit differences

attributions of responsibility

differential understandings

Horowitz (1991)

asserts,

conflict about the nature

and severity of harm), but they might have

of the nature of the conflict of which they are

"There

is

the conflict

of the conflict"

of

in their interpretations

itself,

(p. 2). In the

and there

is

part.

As

the meta-conflict

current context, Celik and

-

the

Blum

(2007) identify three ways in which the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has been framed: (1)
as a conflict between the Turkish state and an ethnic minority, (2) as a conflict between

the Turkish state

and an insurgent group, and

(3) as ethnic tensions

between Turks and

Kurds. These different framings of the conflict identify different issues that are central to
the conflict (e.g., a minority struggling for

its

rights vs. a

problem with terrorism

interethnic tensions respectively), as well as the strategies

vs.

and policies appropriate for

their resolution (e.g., fighting terror vs. granting minority rights vs. designing strategies

to reduce ethnocentrism

and ameliorate the relationship between groups).
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Kurds and most international actors define the problem as a matter of a majority
group (the Turks) denying the rights of a minority group (Cornell, 2001
groups also perceive Turkey as the colonialist enemy (Gunter, 1997,
the Turkish government's stand

on

this issue

has been that

its

Some Kurdish

).

citizens

of Kurdish

ethnicity enjoy full rights as Turkish citizens in Turkey, thus denying that

ethnic minority problem (Kirisci

& Winrow,

1997,

p. 2).

According

Conversely,

p. 51).

Turkey has an

to the official

Turkish discourse, Turkey has a terrorism problem which has been supported by foreign
states

aiming to weaken Turkey (Cornell, 2001; Oke, 2001).

While

at

a policy level there have been debates about the multiple framings of this

no research has investigated

conflict, so far

psychologically construe this conflict.

Do

group members

understanding of the nature of the conflict?
participants

(i.e.,

would endorse

how group members on

I

On

one hand, a terrorism framing of the conflict portrays

PKK and its

legitimizes the Turkish position and

On the

and the Turkish government as the

supporters as the perpetrators. This framing

its

policies; therefore

it

would be more

and

to

some

extent the Turks

support the government's policies, are portrayed as the perpetrators.

legitimizes Kurds' position in the conflict

rights,

it

attractive to

other hand, a minority rights issue frame portrays the Kurdish minority as

the innocent oppressed group, whereas the Turkish state,

who

common

hypothesized that Turkish and Kurdish

the general population (both Turks and Kurds)

Turks.

in conflict share a

a conflict frame that portrays the ingroup in a positive light

ingroup favoring frame).

innocent victims, and the

each side

would primarily be

As

this

framing

and acknowledges the suppression of their

attractive to Kurds.
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Based on

this,

I

predicted that Turks

relative to Kurds,

less likely to

3.1.5

would be more

likely to endorse a terrorism

frame of the

conflict, but

endorse a minority rights issue framing.

The Influence of Ethnic

vs.

National Identification on Construals of Conflict

This study also investigated

how

different types of ingroup identifications (ethnic

versus national identification) affect group members' construals of the conflict. The

interface

between these types of group identifications has gained importance with the

of the number of ethno-national conflicts
Levin,

& Pratto,

1997). Accordingly,

of national identity (which

is

shared

it is

in multi-ethnic states (Sidanius,

among

ethnic groups within a nation state)

In this study, identification with the ethnic

Kurds

in

Turkey hold two

Fechbach,

important to measure and control for the impact

discussing the effect of their unique ethnic identities on

interest.

rise

when

some intergroup outcome.

group

is

the primary variable of

different identities that are likely to be independent

(Kurdish ethnicity and Turkish nationality) whereas for Turks these identities are closely
aligned (Turkish ethnicity and Turkish nationality). Therefore, in this study, both ethnic

(Kurdish and Turkish) and national identification (Turkish nationality) were assessed.
This procedure makes possible the assessment of the two groups' ethnic identification as
the primary predictors while controlling for the potential effects of their shared national

identification.

Second,

I

investigated the effect of shared national identification

individuals' construals of the conflict.

national identification,

al.

I

used Sidanius

To understand the
et al.'s

interface

on

between ethnic and

(1997) theorizing on this issue. Sidanius

et

(1997) identified three ways in which the relation between ethnic and national

identities are

viewed: (1) the melting pot perspective whereby individuals are expected to

minimize emphasis on

their ethnic identity

and instead identify with
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their national

group

only; (2) the multicultural or ethnic pluralism perspective

where dual commitments

to

both ethnic and national identities are seen as appropriate and encouraged both for

dominant and subordinate groups; and (3) the group dominance perspective where
national identity

resources.

is

defined based on the dominant group's identity, symbols and

As Turkey has excluded

the Kurdish identity from

national identity

its

discourse, and even denied that a Kurdish minority group existed within

the beginning of 1920s to the

fits

clearly the group

group

(i.e.,

identify

I

predicted that the dominant

ethnic Turks) relative to the subordinate group

national identification

borders since

end of 1980s (Yegen, 1996), the Turkish- Kurdish context

dominance perspective. As such,

more strongly with

its

(i.e.,

ethnic Kurds)

would

the national group, and the overlap between ethnic and

would be stronger

for the

dominant group

relative to the

subordinate group. Additionally, within the context of the conflict, national identification

should hold different meanings for Turks and for Kurds. For Turks, ethnic and national
identification should predict similar effects

would be associated with higher ingroup

on construals of the

favoritism.

stronger the Turkish national identification the

national group) favoritism

However,

conflict,

such that both

for minority Kurds, the

more they would show ingroup

by endorsing the Turkish narrative of the

(i.e.,

conflict at a higher

degree. In other words, national and ethnic identification were expected to have opposite

effects

on

conflict construals for

Kurdish participants.

3.2 Hypotheses

The construals of the Turkish-Kurdish

conflict

were examined by three dependent

measures: attributions of responsibility, perceived severity of harm, and conflict framing.

The

predictions regarding the type of responsibility (responsibility for the instigation vs.
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the consequences)

the current study,

I

were the same as

made

in

Study

1.

However, extending beyond Study

predictions about the effect of

different target groups, (3) framing

of the

and

conflict,

( 1 )

Who Do Turks and Kurds Hold Responsible

(4) the role

of ethnic versus

summarized below.

for the Conflict?

HI: Members of each group were expected

to attribute less responsibility to

targets associated with their ingroup relative to the outgroup or third parties.

this

in

ethnic group membership, (2)

national identification on conflict construals. All the predictions are

3.2.1

1,

Because

in

study both sides of the conflict are included, this prediction was expected to be

revealed by an interaction between Ethnic group membership and Target group.

Specifically,

(HI a) Kurdish participants were expected
Turkish

state,

to attribute

more

PKK and Kurds.

Turks, and third parties, than the

(Hlb) Conversely, Turkish participants were expected
responsibility to the

(H 1 c)

PKK, Kurds, and

PKK, Kurds, and

to

Turks relative

to

were predicted

third parties relative to

whereas Kurdish participants were predicted

and

to attribute

third parties, than to the state

In addition, Turkish participants

responsibility to the

responsibility to the

to attribute

more

and Turks.

to attribute

more

Kurdish participants;

more

responsibility to the state

Turkish participants.

H2: Paralleling the hypotheses

in

Study

1,

here,

I

also predicted an interaction of

Target group and Type of responsibility. However, because both sides of the conflict are
represented in this study, this interaction was expected to be qualified by Ethnic group

membership. Specifically,
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(H2a) Respondents would perceive parties representing the ingroup as

less

responsible for the instigation than for the consequences of the violent events;

(H2b) however, they would perceive parties representing the outgroup and
parties as

more responsible

for the instigation than for the

third

consequences of the violent

events.

3.2.2

Who Do Turks and Kurds
H3: In

line

Believe Suffered

with the predictions in Study

group such that both groups were expected
as greater than the

3.2.3

Do

harm

inflicted

Due

1, 1

to the Conflict?

predicted a main effect of Target

to perceive the

harm

inflicted

on the ingroup

on the outgroup.

Turks and Kurds Frame the Conflict Differently?

H4:

I

predicted an interaction between Ethnic group membership and Conflict

framing.

Specifically,

(H4a) ethnic Turks relative to Kurds were expected to endorse more strongly a
terrorism frame of the conflict. That

as

between either the

is,

they would be more likely to perceive the conflict

PKK and the people, or the PKK and the

(H4b) By contrast, Kurds relative
issue frame, such that they

government and the

to

would be more

citizens

(i.e.,

state.

Turks were expected

to endorse a minority

likely to perceive the conflict as

Kurdish minority)

in

Turkey.

However, Kurdish and Turkish respondents would be equally
ethnic conflict frame

(i.e.,

a conflict

between Turks and Kurds
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between the

in

likely to endorse an

Turkey).

3.2.4

How Does

Ingroup Identification Influence Turks' and Kurds' Construals of the

Conflict?

3.2.4.1

The Role of Ethnic

3.2.4.1.1 Attributions

Identification

on Construals of the Conflict

of Responsibility

Similar to the predictions in Study

1,

H5: stronger ethnic identification (either Turkish or Kurdish) should be associated
with less responsibility attributed to ingroup targets, and more responsibility attributed to

outgroup targets and to third

parties.

Based on

between ethnic group membership and ethnic

this,

I

predicted an interaction effect

identification,

such that

(H5a) stronger ethnic identification for Turks should be associated with more
responsibility attributed to

state

and

Kurds and

to the

PKK, and

less responsibility attributed to the

to Turks.

(H5b) Conversely, stronger ethnic identification for Kurds should be associated
with more responsibility attributed to the state and to Turks, but less responsibility
attributed to

Kurds and

(H5c) For third

to the

PKK.

parties, only a

main

effect

of ethnic identification was expected,

such that for both groups, the more they would identify with the ethnic group, the more
responsibility they

would

attribute to third parties.

3.2.4.1.2 Severity of Harm

H6:

1

predicted a main effect of ethnic identification, such that for both groups

(Turks and Kurds), stronger ethnic identification was expected to produce more harm
perceived to be inflicted upon the ingroup, and less harm inflicted upon the outgroup.
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3.2.4.2

The Role of Ethnic
I

expected

vs.

that, for

National Identification on Construals of the Conflict

Turks, ethnic and national identification would be highly

correlated, whereas, for Kurds, the relationship

would be weak. Based on

between ethnic and national identification

this,

H7: For Turks, national identification should produce the same trend of effects as
ethnic identification. That

is,

(H7a) stronger national identification was expected to be associated with more
responsibility attributed to the

PKK,

responsibility attributed to the state

to Kurds,

and

and

to third parties, but to less

to Turks.

(H7b) Conversely, national identification should produce the opposite effect of
ethnic identification for Kurds.

the

more they were expected

parties,

and the

less they

The more Kurds

identify with the Turkish national group,

to attribute responsibility to the

were expected

PKK,

to

Kurds and

to attribute responsibility to the state

to third

and

to

Turks.

H8:

I

predicted an interaction effect between national identification and ethnic

group membership, such that for Turks stronger national identification was expected to
predict ingroup favoritism, whereas for Kurds,

favoritism. That

is,

it

was expected

to predict

outgroup

for Turks, stronger national identification should predict

more harm

perceived to be inflicted upon the ingroup, and less harm inflicted upon the outgroup.
contrast, the

more

ethnic

Kurds identify with the Turkish national group the

they would perceive to be inflicted on the ingroup, and the
perceive to be inflicted on the outgroup.
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less

harm

more harm they would

By

3.2.4.3

The Role of Ethnic
H9:

vs.

National Identification on Conflict Framing

predicted an interaction effect of ethnic group membership and ethnic

I

on minority issue framing. Specifically,

identification

(H9a) For Kurds, stronger ethnic identification should predict a higher

endorsement of a minority issue conflict frame
citizens) for Kurds, but a

(H9b) Similarly,

membership and ethnic

a conflict between the state and the

lower endorsement of this framing for Turks.

I

also predicted an interaction effect of ethnic group

identification

identification should predict

between the

(i.e.,

on terrorism framing, such

that, stronger ethnic

more endorsement of a terrorism frame

(i.e.,

a conflict

PKK and the citizens) for ethnic Turks, but less endorsement of this conflict

frame for Kurds.

(H9c)

I

predicted only a main effect of ethnic identification on the endorsement of

ethnic conflict frame

(i.e.,

a conflict between Turkish and Kurdish civilians) such that for

both groups, ethnic identification would be related to a stronger endorsement of an ethnic
conflict frame.

Similar to the previous hypotheses, the strength of national identification

is

expected to produce ingroup favoring biases for Turks, but outgroup favoring biases for
Kurds. With regard to conflict framing, for both Turks and Kurds, the effect of national
identification should exhibit similar trends

H10:

1

which

I

describe below.

predicted a main effect of national identification such that, the

more

respondents (Turks and Kurds) identify with the national group, the more they were

expected to endorse a terrorism frame (HlOa), an ethnic conflict frame (HI Ob), a conflict
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between the

PKK and the

minority issue frame

3.3

(i.e.,

state

(HlOc), but the less they were expected to endorse a

a conflict between the state and the citizens) (HlOd).

Methods

3.3.1 Participants

3.3.1.1 Ethnic

Composition of the Sample

Participants

were 298 Turkish nationals living

in

Turkey. Participants' ethnic

group membership was assessed based on self reports of ethnicity and language spoken
their parents'

household

.

in

Based on these assessments, 194 ethnic Turks (124 females, 57

males, 13 participants did not report their gender) and 80 ethnic Kurds (17 females, 56
males, 7 participants did not report their gender) participated in the survey. In addition,
18 participants identified with an ethnic group other than Turks or Kurds

Caucasian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Arab,

etc.);

two

participants identified themselves with a

Turkish subgroup based on Turkey's regional differences

(e.g.,

the Black Sea region);

four participants identified their ethnic identity as Turkish citizens.

who

identified themselves with a

final

27%

participants

sample of 274 respondents.

83.5%) were recruited

participants (229 participants;

universities in Istanbul. Six participants

of Turks and

The 24

group other than Turkish or Kurdish ethnic groups were

excluded from the analyses leaving a

The majority of the

(e.g.,

were residing

in a

at three

country other than Turkey;

9%

of Kurds were residing in a Turkish city other than Istanbul. The

Ethnic membership

is

a contentious issue in Turkey, especially for Kurds

has been denied for several decades by the Turkish

state.

Due

whose

identity

to the assimilation policies,

many

citizens of Kurdish origin refrain from publicly reporting their ethnic group
membership. As such, it is common to assess Kurdish group membership indirectly by
asking participants to report the language spoken in their household (i.e., Kurdish). This

strategy

is

widely used in Turkish surveys and opinion polls
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(KONDA,

2006).

sample's
25.5,

mean age was 23.03

SD =

years

(SD = 4.93) (Turks:

M= 22.4, SD = 2.9; Kurds: M=

7.52).

The majority (76.3%) of the
families as middle-class,

4.1%

as

ethnic Turks described the

working

class,

economic

status

and 12.4% as upper-middle

of their

class.

Conversely, 58.8% of ethnic Kurds described the economic status of their families as
middle-class,

28.8%

as

working

class,

and 3.8% as upper-middle

class. In addition, in the

Turkish sample, 25.5% of the parents had completed the primary education or lower,

28.5% of the parents had
the parents

a secondary education degree (high school degree), and

had a university or a higher degree.

parents received only primary education,

1

In the Kurdish sample,

40%

of

67.7% of the

1.8% of the parents had secondary education,

and 13.1% of the parents had a university degree or higher.
3.3.1.2

Data Collection Procedures
All participants completed a survey.

One hundred ninety

nine participants

completed hard copy versions of the survey, while 73 participants completed the survey
online

3.3.2

(20% of Turks and 40

% of Kurds)

5
.

All surveys were administered in Turkish.

Measures

3.3.2.1 Attributions

of Responsibility

Attributions of responsibility for the instigation and consequences of the conflict

were examined separately for the

five target groups: the state, the

PKK and other militant

groups, Turks, Kurds, and third parties. First, participants rated the amount of
responsibility they attributed to each group for the instigation of the violent events,

5

The data analyses yielded

the

same pattern of results when the data were analyzed
who completed the hard copy version of the survey

separately for those respondents

those

who completed the

and

online version of the survey.
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vs.

then they rated the responsibility they attributed to the same groups for the consequences

of the conflict

(i.e.,

the

damage and harm

caused).

responsibility attributed to the state (to the Turkish

military) (instigation:

Turks, a

=

a=

.87 for

.87 for Kurds),

Two

items assessed the amount of

government and

to the

Turkish

Turks and a = .85 for Kurds; consequences: a = .86 for

two items assessed the responsibility

attributed to third parties

(foreign groups and neighboring countries) (instigation:

a=

Kurds; consequences: a = .83 for Turks and a =

Kurds), and one item each

.96, for

assessed the amount of responsibility attributed to the

were assessed

in 7-point scales (0

= no

PKK,

responsibility; 6

.80 for Turks

and a = .96

for

Turks, and Kurds. All items

= complete

responsibility).

3.3.2.2 Severity of Harm

Perceived severity of harm was assessed in a similar manner to Study

1

.

One

item

tapping the extent of economic harm was used to estimate the amount of harm inflicted

on Turks and on Kurds. This item was assessed on a 7-point scale (0 = no negative
consequences; 6

= very

negative consequences). In addition, as in Study

1,

each group's

casualty estimates were assessed. However, in order to avoid a no response problem

which frequently occurred
actual

in

number of casualties,

Study

1

for this question, instead

in this study participants

percentage of the innocent casualties

who were

of asking to guess the

were asked

of Turkish

question stated: "Since the start of the violence in 1980s

vs.

till

to estimate the

Kurdish origin. The

now, what percentage of the

innocent victims in this conflict were of Turkish origin and what percentage were of

Kurdish origin?"
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3.3.2.3 Conflict

Framing

Four items were used

to assess participants'

endorsement of each conflict frame:

terrorism, minority issue, ethnic conflict, or a conflict

Specifically, participants rated (0

viewed the

=

not at

between the

Turks and Kurds (ethnic

PKK and the

conflict),

= completely)

5

between Turkish

conflict as: (1) a conflict

issue), (2) a conflict

all,

and

between the

state

state versus the

the degree to

which they

and the citizens (minority

between

citizens (terrorism), (3) a conflict

(4) a conflict

PKK.

between the Turkish

and the

state

PKK.
3.3.2.4 Ingroup Identification

The ingroup

identification scale included the

same items

as in Study

1

adapted to

assess either (1) identification as Turkish citizens, or (2) identification with the ethnic

group. First, participants were asked to complete the measure based on

about being a citizen of Turkey

(i.e.,

a

member of their

(e.g., I

am

feel

national group), and afterwards,

they completed a modified measure in which they were asked

member of their

how they

how they

felt

about being a

ethnic group. National identification items specified the national group

glad to be a citizen of Turkey), however ethnic identification items did not

specify the ethnic group (e.g.,

I

am glad to be

a

member of my

ethnic group). After

responding to the items, participants were asked to specify which ethnic group they had
in

mind when completing

strongly disagree; 6

Turks; a

=

=

the scale. All items

strongly agree).

The

were assessed

in 6-point scales

five ethnic identification items (a

.94 for Kurds) and the five national identification items (a

=.92 for Kurds) revealed very good

reliabilities.
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=

(1

=

=
.95 for

.94 for Turks;

a

3.3.2.5

Demographic Variables
Similar to Study

socio-economic

I,

demographic questions included assessment of gender, age,

and educational

status,

level.

3.4 Results

3.4.1

Who
To

do Turks and Kurds Hold Responsible
test the

(Target group: the

hypotheses (HI and H2) regarding attributions of responsibility, a 5

PKK vs.

the state vs. Turks vs.

responsibility: instigation vs. consequences)

Kurds) mixed

Kurds

vs. third parties)

X 2 (Ethnic group membership: Turks vs.

membership

as the between- subject factor.

predicted (HI), the results yielded a Target group

interaction,

X 2 (Type of

ANOVA was conducted with Target group and Type of responsibility as

within-subject factors, and Ethnic group

As

for the Conflict?

F (4,

1060)

=

68.63,/?

<

.001,

2
rj

=

X

Ethnic group membership

.21, indicating that

respondents exhibit different patterns of attributions (see Figure

Turkish and Kurdish

3).

To

clarify the

hypotheses (Hla-c) two sets of analyses were

interaction effect

and

conducted.

ANOVAs were conducted separately for Turkish and Kurdish

First,

participants (to test

test the specific

Hla and

b).

Then, planned contrasts were conducted to assess

whether Turkish and Kurdish participants differed

in the

amount of responsibility they

attributed to each target group (to test Hlc). Turkish participants placed

responsibility onto the

PKK and third parties,

followed by the

state,

amount of responsibility on Turks, F(4, 756) = 142.99,/? <.001,
participants placed the

.06,

SE -

.19,/?

=

same amount of responsibility on Kurds

.77). All other

2
yj

as

most

Kurds, and the least

=

.43.

on the

Turkish

state

pair-wise comparisons were significant at p

44

<

(

MD =
.001.

-

As expected (Hlb), Kurdish respondents placed most
and

<

third parties, followed

2

.001,

rj

=

by the PKK, Turks, and

by Kurds,

lastly

on the

responsibility

F (4,

304)

=

state

49.87,

p

Planned contrasts showed that Kurdish respondents placed the same

.40.

amount of responsibility on the

PKK as on Turks

same amount of responsibility on
.21). All other pair- wise

the

(

MD —

.53,

PKK as on third parties

SE = .31, p —
(

MD =

-.36,

and the

.09),

SE =

.28,/?

=

comparisons were significant (p < .001).

In addition, as expected (Hlc), Turkish respondents relative to Kurdish

respondents attributed more responsibility to the

.34, to

Kurds,

17.54,

p<

attributed

F (1, 266) = 58.3
2

.001,

more

r\

=

.06;

1

,

p<

.00 1

=

2
,

t]

.

PKK, F(\, 266) =
1

responsibility to the state,

results suggest that

whereas Kurds perceive the
responsibility

parties,

on the

and they place the

The

=

3.16,

p=

way

Turkish respondents

.001,

.08,

2
r\

2
r\

=

=

.23,

and

.012.

state as

PKK as most responsible

for the conflict,

most responsible. In addition, respondents place

institutions (the state or the insurgent group) than

least responsibility

on the

civilians (either

on

third

Turks or Kurds).

=

.02,

were only

Type

which was further qualified by
.02,

2
r\

—

.01.

The means

between Target group, Type of responsibility, and Ethnic

group membership are shown
responsibility

2
rj

group membership, F(4, 1060) = 2.92,/? =

interaction

in

=

F (1, 266) =

analysis also yielded a significant interaction between Target group and

participants' ethnic

r\

each group perceives the outgroup protagonists as most

of responsibility, F(4, 1060) = 5.63,/? < .001,

of the three

to

F(l, 266) = 80.77,/? <

responsible. For example, Turks perceive the

more

to third parties,

whereas Kurdish respondents relative

marginally more responsibility to Turks, F(l, 266)

These

and

8,

2

136.05, p <.001,

Table

3.

Overall, the hypotheses on the type of

partially supported.

As expected
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(H2b), Turkish participants,

perceived the third parties as more responsible for the instigation than for the

consequences of the

conflict,

/ ( 1

89)

=

p=

2.86,

.005.

However, Kurdish participants

perceived third parties to be equally responsible for the instigation as for the

consequences of the

conflict,

responsibility to the

PKK

this difference

SE =

.07),

was

/

(77)

=

.02,

.99.

Both groups attributed

for the instigation than for the

greater for

Kurds

(

F (1,266) = 3.75,/? = .054,

the hypothesis, there

p=

MD =
2
tj

=

-.44,

.014.

was no other evidence

SE =

.

consequences of violence, but
17) than for

Except for

that Turkish

less

Turks

this finding

MD =

(

-.

14,

which supports

and Kurdish respondents

perceived the ingroup targets as less responsible for the instigation than for the

consequences, or that they perceived the outgroup targets as more responsible for the

consequences than for the instigation of conflict.
3.4.2

Who Do Turks and Kurds Believe
To

harm

Suffered

assess the relation between group

inflicted

Due

to the Conflict?

membership and

on the ingroup and on the outgroup (H3),

I

amount of

the perceived

conducted mixed

ANOVAs

with Target of harm (ingroup vs. outgroup) as the within-subject factor and participants'
Ethnic group membership (Turkish vs. Kurdish) as the between-subject factor. Each
indicator of harm

(i.e.,

casualty estimates and economic harm) served as the dependent

measure.

The
The

results

results indicated the

same

pattern of effects across both indicators of harm.

of these analyses are presented below.

For casualty estimates, as predicted by H3, there was a main effect of Target of
harm,

E (\,

the conflict

248)

=

68.72,/?

was estimated

<

to

.001,

2
r\

=

such that a higher percentage of victims in

.22,

be ingroup members
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(M= 60.07, SE =

1

.35) as

compared

to

outgroup members

X

group

(M = 38.72, SE =

1.32).

The

results also yielded an

Ethnic group membership interaction, F(l, 267)

=

76.1 1,/?

<

unexpected Target

(73)

9.42,/?

<

.001.

of Turkish origin)
origin)

However, Turkish respondents' estimates of ingroup

(M =

(M= 47.46, SE =

.98,/?=

1.43),

1.47)

and outgroup victims

were not significantly

E (I,

267)

(M= 5.20, SE =
outgroup

(M=

=

economic harm

<

108.62,/?

.08)

3.85,

.001,

2
rj

indicator, there

=

.29,

was

harm

more severe than

harm

as

SE =

result also revealed a Target

.1 1).

The

2
rj

=

the

victims

victims of Kurdish

other,

t

(176)

=

on the outgroup

inflicted

.08)

S£ = .12),r(192)=

Do Turks
To

test

was not

1.62,/?

=

different

.

effect of Target

inflicted

group

on the

X Ethnic group

.17 (see Figure 4), such that

{M= 3.23, SE =

from the harm

Kurdish

(M= 5.70, SE =
.19),

However, Turkish respondents' perceived amount of harm

(M= 4.69, SE =

3.4.3

(i.e.,

such that the harm inflicted on the ingroup

respondents perceived the amount of harm inflicted on them
severe than the

main

a

was perceived

membership, F(l, 248) = 52.03,/? < .001,

.001.

(i.e.,

from each

different

.22.

.33.

Similarly, for the

group,

SE =

50.23,

=

(M= 29.99, SE = 2.21), t

2.26) to be higher than the percentage of outgroup victims

=

r\

(M= 69.92,

Kurdish respondents estimated the percentage of innocent ingroup victims

SE =

2

.001,

inflicted

t

(76)

inflicted

=

.13) as

more

10.76,/?

<

on the ingroup

on the outgroup

(M = 4.47,

11.

and Kurds Frame the Conflict Differently?

H4 on the

role

of group membership on conflict framing, a 4 (Conflict

framing: PKK-state vs. PKK-citizens vs. state-citizens vs. ethnic conflict)

group membership: Turks

vs.

Kurds) mixed

subject variable and Ethnic group

X 2 (Ethnic

ANOVA with Conflict framing as the within

membership

47

as the

between subject variable was

conducted. The degree of endorsement of each conflict frame was the dependent

measure. Supporting H4, the results yielded an interaction between Conflict framing and
Ethnic group membership, F(3, 798)
conflict primarily as

between the

=

state

40.56,/?

and the

<

.001,

2
rj

state

and

its

(M= 2.49, SE =

citizens

Turks perceived the

.13.

PKK (M= 3.39, SE =

perceived the conflict as equally between the state and the

between the

=

.06),

while Kurds

PKK (M= 2.91, SE =

(270)

=

3.41,

p=

.001;

weaker minority issue framing,
difference between the

t

PKK vs.

(269)

two groups

=

citizens:

-7.18,/?

14)

and

.16) (see Figure 5). Additionally,

supporting H4a-b, Turks relative to Kurds endorsed a stronger terrorism framing

vs. state: t

.

t

<

in the degree to

(267)

.001.

=

5.87,/?

<

.001),

(PKK

and a

However, there was no

which they endorsed the ethnic

conflict framing.

3.4.4

How Does

Ingroup Identification Influence Turks' and Kurds' Construals of the

Conflict?

First, the strength

examined

of ethnic and national identification and their relationship were

for each group. Then, a series

of regression analyses were conducted with

ethnic and national identification as the predictors and each construal measure as the

dependent variable.
3.4.4.1 Ethnic

and National Identification

Kurds endorsed a stronger ethnic

(M= 3.65, SD =1.55) t (272) = 2.75,/? =
2.26,

SD =

1.34) than Turks

identification

.006, but a

(M= 4.09, SD =

1.46),

(M= 4.20, SD =

weaker national
and

t

(272)

ethnic and national identification respectively (see Figure 6).
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=

As

1.38) than Turks

identification

-9.66,/?

<

(M=

.001 for

predicted, whereas

ethnic and national identification were highly correlated for Turks (r

relationship

Due

between the two types of identification
to the

for

Kurds

(r

=

=

.76), there

was no

.09).

high overlap between ethnic and national identification for Turks, the

two types of identification

(ethnic

and national) could not be included simultaneously as

predictors in regression analyses, due to multicol linearity concerns. In contrast, for

Kurds, there was no overlap between ethnic and national identification, therefore, the
effect of

one type of identification was not affected by the other type. In other words, for

Kurds, whether ethnic and national identification were included simultaneously in the

same regression
results

analysis vs.

examined separately

were the same. Based on

this,

and

in different regression analyses, the

to parallel the analyses with ethnic Turks, here

I

present the results of a series of regression analyses that include either ethnic or national

identification as the

main

predictor. Additional predictors include ethnic

group

membership, and the interaction between group identification and ethnic group
membership.
3.4.4.2

The Role of Ethnic

3.4.4.2.1 Attributions

The

effect

Identification

on Construals of Conflict

of Responsibility

of ethnic identification on attributions of responsibility (H5) was

assessed by conducting regression analyses with ethnic identification, ethnic group

membership, and

their interaction as predictors.

measure served as the dependent

variable.

The

Each

effect

attribution of responsibility

of identification was tested

separately for ingroup and outgroup measures.

The

effects

of ethnic and national identification revealed the same pattern of

relationships across

Type of responsibility

(i.e.,
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for instigation as for the

consequences of

the events). Therefore, similar to Study

Type of responsibility
(a

=

.88),

for the

PKK (a =

and third parties (a =

The
Hypothesis

1,

Only

.95).

=

.89), the state (a

the

.94),

were collapsed across

Turks (a =

combined analyses

.88),

Kurds

are presented.

effects for ethnic identification are presented in Table 4. Supporting

5,

ethnic group

across in- and outgroup targets there

membership and ethnic

attribution separately for Turkish

analyses are summarized in Table

was a

significant interaction

identification (see Table 4).

interaction effects, ethnic identification

was entered

5.

As

To

clarify the

results

of these regression

expected, for ethnic Turks, the

more

more they

responsibility they attributed to the

third parties, but the less responsibility they attributed to the state

(supporting H5a). Conversely, for ethnic Kurds, the

more they

group, the more responsibility they attributed to the

state, to

the less responsibility they attributed to the

between

as a predictor of each target of

and Kurdish participants. The

identified with their ethnic group, the

Kurds and

the attribution measures

PKK,

and

to

the

Turks

identified with their ethnic

Turks, and third parties, but

PKK (supporting H5b).

The

strength of

Kurdish identification was not associated with attributions of responsibility to Kurds.
3.4.4.2.2 Severity of Harm

The same procedure

as for attributions of responsibility

effect of ethnic identification

was used

to assess the

on perceived severity of harm on the ingroup and on the

outgroup. Specifically, regression analyses were conducted with ethnic identification,
ethnic group membership, and their interaction as predictors.

measure

(i.e.,

Each

severity of harm

casualty estimate and economic harm) served as a dependent variable.

effect of identification

was

tested separately for ingroup
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and outgroup measures. The

The

each measure of ingroup and outgroup harm are

results of these regression analyses for

summarized

in

Table

6.

For the economic harm, as predicted (H6), the results revealed a main effect of
ethnic identification, such that the

the

more respondents

more harm they thought had been

inflicted

on

identified with their ethnic group,

ingroup and the less harm they

their

thought had been inflicted on the outgroup. Although the interaction between ethnic

group membership and ethnic identification was not significant, regression analyses
conducted separately for each ethnic group revealed that stronger ethnic identification

was associated with

greater perceived ingroup harm,

=

lower outgroup harm,
Kurds, £=.ll,/(75)

=

-.26,

.96,

p=

t

(187)

=

-3.73,

p<

/?

=

.23,

t

(187)

=

3.23,

p=

.001,

and

.001, only for Turks, but not for

.34 for ingroup harm, and

=

/?

-. 1

8,

t

(75)

=

- 1

.67,

p = A0

for outgroup harm.

For casualty estimates, the results yielded a main effect of ethnic identification

and an unexpected ethnic identification

X ethnic group membership interaction both for

ingroup and outgroup casualty estimates (see Figure
effects, ethnic identification

was used

to predict

7).

To

clarify these interaction

each measure separately for Turks and

Kurds. For Turks, stronger ethnic identification was associated with a higher estimate of

=

ingroup casualties,

outgroup casualties /?

was no

=

.74,

relationship

p >

.05, or

=

.36, /

-.40,

(174)

t

=

(174)

between ethnic

5.14,

=

p < .001, and with a lower estimate of

-5.81,

p < .001. However, for ethnic Kurds there

identification

outgroup casualties,

/?

only lend partial support for Hypothesis

=

-.08,

t

and estimates of ingroup /? =

(73)

=

-.70,

p>

6, in that the prediction

not for Kurds.
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.05.

.09,

t

(74)

Thus, these results

holds only for Turks, but

3.4.4.3

The Role of Ethnic

vs.

National Identification on Construals of Conflict.

of Responsibility

3.4.4.3.1 Attributions

The same procedure

was used

as for ethnic identification

of national identification are presented

in

of

A summary of the results of the

national identification on attributions of responsibility.

effects

to test the effect

Table

7.

Unlike for ethnic identification,

the interaction

between ethnic group membership and national identification was not

significant for

any target group (see Table

identification

had similar

more respondents
attributed to the

7).

Lending support

effects both for Turkish

attributed to the state

the Kurds,

and

and the

to Turks.

The

third parties,

results

Hypothesis

7,

national

and Kurdish respondents, such

identified with the national group, the

PKK,

to

more

and the

that the

responsibility they

less responsibility they

of separate regression analyses for each

ethnic group with national identification as the predictor and each target of attribution as

the dependent

Table

5.

measure are shown side by side with the effects of ethnic identification

in

For Turks, national identification predicted the same effect as ethnic

identification (supporting H7a),

whereas for Kurds, national identification had opposite

effects to ethnic identification (supporting H7b).

3.4.4.3.2 Severity of Harm

The same procedures were used
perceived severity of harm.
expected, there

membership

was an

to test the effect

A summary of the results

interaction effect

for both indicators of harm.

identification

was used

to predict

is

of national identification on
presented in Table

8.

As

between national identification and ethnic group

To

clarify the interaction effects, national

each measure of harm separately for Turks and Kurds.

For Turks, as expected (H8), national identification paralleled the effects of ethnic
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identification. Specifically, the

more

more economic harm they perceived
3.70,

p<

.33,

(190)

/

and the

.001,

=

less

<

-4.73,/?

ethnic Turks identified with their national group, the

to

be experienced by the ingroup,

harm they perceived

to

=

.46, t

(174)

<

5.14,/?

By

.35,

t

their

(72)

=

=

=

/?

-

casualties

/?

=

.36,

casualties,

t

/?

=

-

more

ingroup and more harm experienced by the outgroup.

ethnic

Kurds
to

identified with the national identification, the less

be experienced by the ingroup,

and the more economic harm they perceived
(75)

=

3.25,/?

=

.002 (see Figure

identification predicted lower estimates

/

90)

1

contrast, for Kurds, as expected (H8), national identification predicted less

economic harm they perceived

=

t (

= -6.77, p <. 001.

Specifically, the

.02,

.26,

.001. Likewise, stronger national identification for ethnic Turks,

and lower estimates of the percentage of outgroup

.001,

harm experienced by

p=

=

be experienced by the outgroup,

was associated with higher estimates of the percentage of ingroup
(174)

/?

p=

-3.45,

8).

to

/?

=

=

3.4.4.4

The Role of Ethnic

/

(75)

=

-2.44,

be experienced by the outgroup,

/?

Similarly, for Kurds, stronger national

of the percentage of ingroup

.001, but higher estimates for outgroup casualties,

3.46,/?

-.27,

casualities,

=

.38,

t

/?

=

(72)

-.38,

=

.001.

To

test

vs.

National Identification on Conflict Framing.

Hypothesis 9 on the effect of ethnic identification on conflict framing, four

regression analyses were conducted with each conflict frame as the dependent variable.

Results are summarized in Table

9.

The

results revealed

an interaction effect of ethnic

group membership and ethnic identification on minority issue framing. Table 10

summarizes the

results

of the effects of ethnic identification on conflict framing

separately for Turks and Kurds. Specifically, the
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more Turks

identified with their ethnic

group, the less they viewed the conflict as between the state and the citizens

(i.e.,

minority issue), whereas the more Kurds identified with their ethnic group, the more they

perceived the conflict as between the state and the citizens (see Table

As

expected, the analysis did not yield an interaction effect of ethnic group

membership and ethnic

identification

stronger ethnic identification

between the

was not

Whereas

between the

identification

was

for ethnic Kurds, stronger ethnic

PKK and Turkish citizens).

The analyses revealed a main

conflict

a higher endorsement of a conflict

related to the endorsement of the terrorism frame (framing the

between the

ethnic conflict frame

on terrorism framing. However, for ethnic Turks,

was associated with

PKK and the citizens.

identification

conflict as

10).

of ethnic identification on the endorsement of

a conflict between Turkish and Kurdish civilians) and of a

(i.e.,

state

effect

and the PKK. Specifically, for both groups, ethnic

related to stronger endorsement of an ethnic conflict frame,

stronger endorsement of a conflict between the state and the

The same procedures were used

to assess the effect

PKK (supporting

and

to a

H9c).

of national identification. As

expected (H10) the effect of national identification showed the same trend as ethnic
identification for Turks, but the opposite trend of ethnic identification for Kurds.

The

separate effects of national identification on each conflict frame for Turks and Kurds are

summarized

in

Table

Specifically, the

the

10, side

(i.e.,

effects

more respondents (Turks and Kurds)

more they endorsed

issue frame

by side with the

a terrorism frame (HlOa)

a conflict

between the

state

of ethnic identification.
identified with the national group,

and the

and the

less they

citizen ns)

endorsed a minority

(HI Ob). Whereas for

Turks, national identification was also related to a stronger endorsement of an ethnic
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conflict frame

was no

and of a conflict between the

relationship

between national

PKK and the

identification

state, for ethnic

Kurds there

and these dimensions.

3.5 Discussion

3.5.1

How Do Turks and Kurds Construe the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict in Turkey?
Study 2 extended the findings of Study

construals of group

members from two

1

by assessing and comparing the

sides of a conflict,

and by examining whether two

types of identification (national and ethnic) influence these construals.

examined

attributions of responsibility, perceived severity of harm,

As

in

Study

1,

and additionally

assessed each side's framing of the conflict.

First,

on the
the

supporting

H

1

more

responsibility

PKK than on the state, while Kurds placed more responsibility on the

PKK.

general as

Similarly, each group attributed

compared

to ingroup

third parties than to Turkish

more

the findings revealed that Turks placed

,

responsibility

on

more

responsibility to outgroup

members. Respondents

attributed

more

state

than on

members

in

responsibility to

and Kurdish people. Notably, both Turks and Kurds placed
and insurgent groups than on the general

state institutions

population (ordinary Turks and Kurds), regardless of whether they were associated with
the ingroup or the outgroup. These findings suggested that respondents might not

attribute responsibility to the

subgroups within the

in- or

group as a whole, rather they differentiate among

distinct

outgroup. This distinction might have important implications

for the study of intergroup conflict. Intergroup tensions are likely to exacerbate if the

outgroup as a whole

is

held responsible for the negative behaviors of outgroup extremists

or other subgroups. In the present study,

it

was assumed

that the

PKK and the state are

protagonists of the Kurdish and the Turkish groups respectively. However,
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it is

possible

that respondents

themselves perceived the

than a part of each group. In other words,

PKK
it

It is

not clear

is

the state and the insurgent groups such as the

and the

PKK

state as separate entities, rather

how Kurds and Turks

vis-a-vis the ethnic in-

perceive

and outgroups.

important to replicate these findings with subgroups which, from the respondents'

perspective, are perceived as part of the ingroup or the outgroup.

The findings did not lend support

for the hypotheses regarding type

responsibility (instigation vs. consequences) (H2).

It is

not applicable in this particular context of conflict.

The

responsibility

(i.e.,

instigation vs. consequences

that the ingroup has

justify ingroup's

harmed

the outgroup, in

of

possible that these hypotheses are

predictions about distinct types of

of events) were based on the assumption

which case group members

harmdoing would be more inclined

in order to

to place responsibility

on the

outgroup for instigating the events. However, in the current study, respondents did not
perceive the conflict as involving ethnic tensions between ordinary Turks and Kurds, but

as

between the

PKK and the

state.

Third, with regard to severity of harm, as predicted, Kurdish respondents

perceived the harm inflicted on them to be greater than the harm inflicted on the
outgroup. But, Turkish respondents perceived equal amount of harm inflicted on their

ingroup and the outgroup, thus not lending support to the ingroup favoritism hypothesis.

However, these findings are meaningful
a terrorism problem. Terrorism

would

to the extent that

affect

Turks perceived the conflict as

everyone equally, regardless of their ethnic

group membership.
In this study

I

assessed conflict framing in order to examine whether two sides in

a conflict have similar or different understanding of what the conflict
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is

about.

Each

conflict frame posits

two

different groups as the primary parties in the conflict. For

perceived as a minority issue, the state and the Kurdish citizens

example,

if the conflict is

would be

the primary parties in conflict.

conflict, then

The

However

perceived as an ethnic

if the conflict is

Kurds and Turks as ethnic groups would be the primary

differences in conflict framing were notable. Overall, Turks were

the conflict as a terrorism issue

whereas Kurds were more
conflict either

between the

(i.e.,

likely to

state

which respondents view the

as a conflict

view the

and the

between the

state

parties in conflict.

more

likely to

and the PKK),

conflict as a minority rights issue

PKK or the

state

and the

conflict purely as a disagreement

view

citizens).

(i.e.,

The

a

extent to

between ordinary

citizens

of the two ethnic groups was low for both groups.
3.5.2

Do

Individual Differences in Ethnic and National Identification Affect Construals

of the Conflict?
Overall, individual differences in the strength of ethnic identification had an

important influence on construals of the conflict across

all

three dependent variables. For

both ethnic groups, stronger ethnic identification was associated with ingroup favoritism.

For example, stronger ethnic identification was related
responsibility to outgroup targets

and

to (a) attributing

less responsibility to

more

ingroup targets, (b) more harm

perceived to be inflicted on the ingroup and less harm perceived to be inflicted on the
outgroup, as well as to (c) endorsement of conflict frames that portray the ingroup in a

positive light.

For Turks, national identification was strongly correlated with ethnic
identification,

and consequently

construals of conflict.

However,

it

paralleled the effects of ethnic identification

for Kurds, national identification
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was not

on

related to

ethnic identification; that

their ethnic

is,

the degree to

which Kurdish respondents

group was not associated with the degree to which they identified with the

As

Turkish nation.

predicted, for Kurdish respondents, identification with the Turkish

nation produced outgroup favoritism (e.g., perceiving

less

identified with

outgroup responsibility for the

conflict).

These

with minority and majority groups in multiethnic

more ingroup

responsibility and

results are in line with prior literature

states.

For example, Brewer (1991)

claimed that policies of national assimilation are threatening to minority groups and lead
minority group

members

to strengthen their ties with the minority group. Similarly,

perceived ingroup discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind,

&

Solheim, 2009; Schmitt

& Branscombe, 2002) and perceived rejection (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007) drive minority
group members
line, the

to disidentify (i.e., distance

themselves) with the national group. In this

degree to which Kurds identified with their ethnic group was stronger than the

degree to which Turks identified with their ethnic group. The current research went a step
further in

showing

group members'

that ethnic

Kurds) construals of conflict.

(i.e.,

Overall, Study

on construals of the

and national identification had opposite effects on minority

1

-2

provided strong support for the effect of ingroup identification

conflict.

Moreover, Study 2 investigated the impact of different types

of identification demonstrating that ethnic and national identification for minority groups

might have opposite effects on construals of the
in

both contexts

(i.e.,

conflict.

of Studies 1-2) the violence

is

However,

not ongoing.

it

The

should be noted that
current disputes

between Turks and Armenians primarily concern the interpretations of the past and
despite the strained diplomatic ties between

Turkey and Armenia, there has been no

ongoing violence between the two people. In the Turkish-Kurdish
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conflict, despite the

continuing inequalities between the two groups' socioeconomic status and other major
post-conflict issues (e.g., the return of internally displaced people to their villages), the

violence has diminished in recent years. Research on intractable conflicts (see Bar-Tal,

2000, 2003) and intergroup threat

(e.g.,

Bar-Tal, 2004; Roccas, Klar,

& Liviatan, 2006;

Rothgerber, 1997) suggests that the predictive value of individual differences

diminish

when

case, ascribed

the threat to the ingroup

membership

in a

is

high and

when

violence

is

likely to

ongoing. In such a

group (rather than individual differences

identification) is likely to be the

is

in psychological

main predictor of perceptions and judgments relevant

to

intergroup outcomes. In a similar vein, at an individual level of analysis, the strength of
the situation moderates the effect of the individual differences on behavior such that this

effect

is

weaker

homogenous

for strong situations (Mischel, 1977). Thus,

test these principles

The

may

exhibit

construals of an intergroup conflict (regardless of individual differences in

ingroup identification)

contexts.

group members

when

violence and threat are ongoing.

As

such,

it is

important to

of ingroup favoritism and ingroup identification in a wider array of

strength of ingroup identification might be an important predictor of

construals of past conflict only in contexts where violence and threat have diminished.

One of the

goals of the next study

identification

was

to investigate the relationship

and construals of violence

in the context

characterized by severe violence between groups.

59

between ingroup

of an ongoing conflict

CHAPTER 4

STUDY

3:

THE ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN HUTUS AND TUTSIS

IN

BURUNDI

4.1 Introduction

The

current study

aimed

conflict, the ethnic conflict

is

to

extend the research in a different context of intergroup

between Hutus and Tutsis

in

Burundi. The conflict in Burundi

characterized by extreme forms of violence between Hutus and Tutsis since early

1960s, and the conflict

the conflict;

ongoing. Hutus have been the main target of violence during

however since 1993,

out by both sides.

this

is

It

the violence has been mutual with massacres carried

was only very

recently, in

March 2009

study had ended), that the major Hutu rebel

(after the data collection for

movement (FNL, Forces Nationales de

Liberation) started to demobilize combatants.

In addition to extending the previous research in a context of ongoing conflict

violence,

I

expanded upon the findings of Study 2

First,

in three other important

Study 2 investigated attributions of responsibility

two ethnic groups

(e.g.,

ways.

to targets aligned

the Turkish state with the Turkish ethnic group; and, the

with the Kurdish ethnic group). However,

themselves perceived the

PKK and the

it

was not

and

with the

PKK

clear whether respondents

state as protagonists that

belong

to the in- or

outgroup. Therefore, in the current study, instead of specifying the particular subgroups,

distinguished

more broadly between

'extremist groups' and 'people in general' (both of

the in- and outgroup). In this way, each subgroup
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was

explicitly included within the

I

ingroup's or outgroup's representation.

As

the focus of this study

was on

different

ingroup and outgroup targets, the perceived role of third parties was not examined.

Second,

I

extended the previous investigation of attributions of responsibility by

assessing the relationship between ingroup responsibility and legitimization of ingroup's

harmdoing. Studies

1

and 2 demonstrated

that

group members acknowledged some

ingroup responsibility both for the instigation and for the consequences of events. In
addition group

members might be motivated

for the instigation than for the

engagement
is

that

in acts

to assign less responsibility to the ingroup

consequences of conflict. As such, the ingroup's

of violence

is

The implication

likely to be perceived as self-defense.

acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility does not inevitably imply accepting

liability for the

harm done. Sometimes, due

feasible to defer ingroup's responsibility,

sufficient. In these instances,

responsibility, but at the

to social reality features,

and

its

it

might not be

reduction might not be

deemed

group members might acknowledge ingroup's

same time

legitimize the violence. For example, governments

accept responsibility for their military interventions but they also claim that these
interventions serve humanitarian purposes, are carried out as a last resort, or because the

enemy

is

dangerous (Cohrs

et al.,

2003). This

may be

particularly likely for ongoing

conflicts rather than past conflict because people don't

conflict to

have "cooled down"

have necessary distance from the

sufficiently.

Consistent with this argument,

some research suggests

that claiming responsibility

and blameworthiness are conceptually different processes (Shaver

& Drown,

example, early research on harmdoing

Davis

at the individual level (e.g.,

Glass, 1964) demonstrated that although participants
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who were

1986). For

& Jones,

assigned by

1960;

experimenters to cause harm to a victim were aware that they did the actual inflicting,
they attributed the blame for the injustice either to the experimenter or to the situation.

Shaver (1985)

in his

theory of attributions of blame elaborates different dimensions and

strategies that are useful to distinguish

moral responsibility from blameworthiness. One

important strategy that alters one's blameworthiness, but not one's responsibility,

perceived justification for the harmdoing

although the act was reprehensible,

163).

Based on

harmdoing
were

this, in the

(i.e.,

relationship

I

p.

explicitly assessed justification of ingroup's

which group members believed

and were a reaction

the

a perpetrator group might argue that

served a larger social purpose) (Shaver, 1985,

current study,

the degree to

in self-defense,

it

(e.g.,

is

to provocation

that ingroup violent acts

by the outgroup).

A

negative

between ingroup responsibility and the degree of legitimization would

indicate acceptance of liability for ingroup harmdoing, while a positive relationship

between ingroup responsibility and the legitimization of ingroup harmdoing would
indicate denial of ingroup's liability.

Finally, the current study

by adding a new measure

expanded assessment of the perceived severity of harm

that has

been used recently

in the literature to assess

competitive victimhood (Noor

et al.,

degree to which the ingroup

believed to have suffered more than the outgroup (Noor et

al.,

2008).

is

2008). Competitive victimhood

The development of competitive victimhood

as a construct

is

defined as the

stemmed from

research showing that groups in conflict exclusively focus on their victimhood, and this

preoccupation with one's victimhood leads to a competition over

harm (Nadler

&

who

has suffered more

Saguy, 2004). Competitive victimhood have been found to be associated
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with negative intergroup outcomes, such as less empathy for the outgroup or less
willingness for forgiveness (Noor et

In the first

two

studies

I

2008).

al.,

assessed the severity of harm perceived to be inflicted on

the ingroup and on the outgroup separately,

and then,

whether group members perceived the harm

inflicted

harm

inflicted

on the outgroup. Different from

this

I

compared them

on

to find out

their ingroup as greater than the

approach, competitive victimhood

implies a direct intergroup comparison of the degree of suffering.

The measure asks

respondents to engage in those cross-group comparisons of harm suffered, but
provide information about the degree to which group
suffered. Competitive victimhood

members

it

does not

believe each group has

might provide a measurement advantage

in contexts

such as Burundi where both groups have suffered a great deal. The severe extent of
victimization might lead to ceiling effects in the measures of perceived severity of harm

used

in the first

measures,

I

1

.

1

studies. Therefore, in the current study, in addition to the previous

also included competitive victimhood to assess perceived severity of harm.

Below,
4.

two

I

provide a description of the conflict in Burundi.

A Description of the Conflict in Burundi
Burundi, a small country in eastern Africa with a population of six million, gained

its

independence from colonial Belgium

had a turbulent history of violent ethnic
ethnic composition are

The

85%

Hutus,

in 1962. Since its

conflict.

14%

The most

Tutsis and

independence, Burundi has
citied statistics for

1% Twas

(Lemarchand, 1994,

inhabitants of Burundi are referred to as Barundi (plural) and as

The Belgian

colonial

power and Catholic missionaries

superior to Hutus and used racial ideologies to
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in

Burundi's

Murundi

p. 6).

(singular).

Burundi viewed Tutsis as

make changes

in political, social

and

cultural institutions, thus limiting access to

power and wealth only

Ndura, 2006; Mamdani, 2001). The Tutsi minority has been mainly

responsibility (Lemarchand, 1994, pp. xiv). Since

Burundi has been the scene of violent

its

in 1965, 1972, 1988,

Lemarchand, 1994; Turner, 2005; Wolpe

mass

first

&

positions of

in 1962,

killings

mostly

and 1991 (Daley, 2006;

& Mcdonald, et al., 2004).

began with the assassination of Ndadaye, the

all

independence

conflict, including large scale

by the Tutsi gendarmerie toward Hutus

(Makoba

in control since the

colonial period, whereas Hutus have been systematically excluded from

power and

6

to Tutsis

In 1993, a civil

war

democratically elect Hutu president.

This event led to revenge-oriented attacks by Hutus on Tutsis, which in turn led the Tutsi
military to counter-attack

was involved
2006).

civil

in a series

Hutu communities (Lemarchand, 1994). After 1993, Burundi

of ethnic massacres and selective genocide (Makoba

The extent of victimization

war

in 1993,

it is

Burundi has been enormous. Since the

in

& Ndura,

start

of a

estimated that about 300,000 people were killed; 800,000 were

forced to flee the country; and about 700,000 were internally displaced (Daley, 2006;

Wolpe

& Mcdonald, et al., 2004).

Africa has so

much

Lemarchand (1994,

violence killed so

many people on

p. xi), states that

so

many

"Nowhere

else in

occasions in so small a

space as in Burundi." Burundi has been going through a political transition since the

of the Arusha Accords

in 1998,

although the violence has continued.

An

start

internationally

brokered power-sharing agreement between Tutsi dominated government and Hutu rebels
in

2003 led

60%

6

and

to democratic elections in

40%

of the posts

in the

2005

in

which Hutus and Tutsis held respectively

government and national assembly (Lemarchand, 2006).

European colonialists perceived Tutsis

to

have Semitic and Aryan

2001)
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traits

(Mamdani,

In addition to the bloodshed,

Burundi

economy has been devastated by
4.1.2 Conflict

Framing

in

is listed

among

the world's poorest countries;

the long lasting conflict.

Burundi

Hutus and Tutsis have different narratives of the

20

-

its

conflict.

Lemarchand (1994,

30) describes the two narratives as follows. For Hutus, the ethnic conflict

is

pp.

a

continuation of historical antagonisms since the precolonial period. Hutus were the

oppressed majority in the hands of the Tutsi minority

whom

they view as foreigners

who

migrated to Burundi from the North. For Tutsis on the other hand, the ethnic conflict in

Burundi

is

a remnant of the colonial rule

which

oppression of Hutus by Tutsis and look back
social

harmony. "There

minority; there

is

is

at the

deny the

precolonial times as an inspiration for

no such a thing as a Tutsi minority, only a reactionary

no Hutu-Tutsi

(Lemarchand, 1994,

instilled ethnic divisions. Tutsis

p. 28).

conflict, only a "gigantic" imperialist plot"

Lemarchand (1994) argues

the privileged position in society

is

that Tutsis'

way of maintaining

by denying the importance of ethnic

identities,

including the Tutsi identity, thus legitimizing the rule of the minority. Overall, each
side's beliefs about the conflict provide an ingroup favoring narrative in the current

context of the conflict.

Based on

this,

I

predicted that Hutus

acknowledge ethnic tensions
Tutsis),

and

its

Burundi

and a conflict between the

citizens

(i.e.,

state

(i.e.,

Tutsis, as a

likely than Tutsis to

a conflict between ordinary Hutus and

(which has been represented mostly by Tutsis)

Hutus). Hutus and Tutsis

between extremist groups.
to

in

would be more

way

to

would equally perceive

the conflict as

deny ethnic tensions, might be more

likely

endorse a conflict between extremist groups and citizens (both Hutus and Tutsis).
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4.2 Hypotheses

4.2.

1

Who

do Hutus and Tutsis Hold Responsible for the Conflict?

The predictions with regard

to

Type of responsibility

instigation vs. responsibility for the consequences), Ethnic

group follow from Studies

HI
that both

:

(i.e.,

group membership, and Target

1-2. Specifically,

Similar to the previous studies,

groups

(responsibility for the

I

predicted a main effect of Target group such

Hutu and Tutsi respondents) would

the violent conflict to their ingroup (both extremists

attribute less responsibility for

and general population) and more

responsibility to the outgroup.

H2:
such

that,

I

expected an interaction between Target group and Type of responsibility

respondents would perceive the ingroup targets as less responsible for the

instigation than for the

consequences of the events (H2a); by contrast, they would

perceive the outgroup targets as

more responsible

for the

consequences than for the

instigation of the events (H2b).

The

target groups in the current study included the 'extremists'

and 'people

in

general'.

H3:

I

predicted a main effect of Type of target, such that

more

responsibility

was

expected to be attributed to the extremist groups than to the general population.
In addition, here

I

also explored the relationship

and legitimization of ingroup acts of violence.
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between ingroup responsibility

4.2.2

Who Do

Hutus and Tutsis Believe Suffered due

H4: Following the Hypotheses

in

Study

2,

I

to the Conflict?

predicted a main effect of Target

group such that both groups were expected to perceive the harm
as greater than the

4.2.3

harm

Do Hutus and

inflicted

Tutsis

Frame

inflicted

on the ingroup

on the outgroup.
the Conflict Differently?

Similar to Study 2, four conflict frames were assessed in the current study. Here

the parties in the conflict

were Hutus,

Tutsis, the state,

and extremist groups from each

side.

H5:

I

predicted that respondents of both groups would perceive the conflict

primarily as a as an ethnic conflict

(i.e.,

perceiving the conflict as an interethnic conflict

between Tutsis and Hutus).
H6: Furthermore,

I

predicted that Hutus

endorse an ethnic conflict framing

(i.e.,

likely to endorse a conflict

However,

I

likely than Tutsis to

a conflict between ordinary Hutus and Tutsis)

(H6a), and a conflict between the state and

would be more

would be more

its

citizens

(i.e.,

Hutus) (H6b). Whereas Tutsis

between extremist groups and

citizens (H6c).

did not expect differences between Hutus and Tutsis in the degree to

which they would endorse a

conflict

between extremist groups.
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4.2.4

How Does

Ethnic Identification Influence Hutus' and Tutsis' Construals of the

7

Conflict ?

4.2.4.1 Attributions

of Responsibility

Similar to predictions in Studies

1

and

2,

stronger ethnic identification

was

expected to be associated with less responsibility attributed to ingroup targets but more
responsibility attributed to outgroup targets.

H7:

I

Based on

this,

predicted that for both groups, stronger ethnic identification should be

associated with less responsibility attributed to the ingroup (H7a), but with

more

responsibility attributed to the outgroup (H7b).

4.2.4.2 Severity of Harm

H8: For both groups, stronger ethnic identification should predict more harm
perceived to be inflicted upon the ingroup (H8a), and less harm inflicted upon the

outgroup (H8b). Furthermore, for both ethnic groups, stronger ethnic identification
should be associated with higher ratings of competitive victimhood (H8c).
4.2.4.3 Conflict

I

Framing

predicted that the strength of ingroup identification

membership

would enhance

the group

effects. Specifically,

H9: For Hutus, stronger ethnic identification should be associated with a
heightened endorsement of an ethnic conflict frame
Tutsis) (H9a),

and a

conflict

between the

state

and

(i.e.,

its

a conflict

between Hutus and

citizens (H9b). Tutsis' ethnic

Following up on study 2, a measure of national identification was included, but because
Burundian national identity was not related to either Hutu or Tutsi identities, no
predictions were

made about

the effect of national identification. In fact, supplemental

showed that no significant relationships for any of the dependent
found beyond what was predicted for ethnic identification.
analyses
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variables were

identification should exhibit the opposite effects in these dependent measures.

Additionally, for Tutsis, stronger ethnic identification should be associated with a

heightened endorsement of a conflict between extremist groups and the general
population (H9c). This relationship should be the opposite for Hutus.

4.3

Methods

4.3.1 Participants

Participants

were

1

2

1

(40

women,

8

1

men) undergraduate students and recent

graduates of two different universities in Bujumbura. Fifty six participants identified

themselves as ethnic Hutus, 58 as ethnic Tutsis, one as Twa, and six participants did not
identify their ethnic group

membership. For the purposes of this study, only the data of

the participants that identified themselves as either Hutus or Tutsis are included in the

analyses.

The age of participants ranged from 18

participants,

32.5% were from

to

36

(M— 26.3, SD =

5.8).

Among the

the capital Bujumbura, while the rest of the sample

from other regions of Burundi. The extent of victimization
considerably high. Based on self-reports,

experienced physical violence, and

65%

38%

of Hutus and

of Hutus' and

had experienced physical violence. Furthermore,
been displaced during the course of the
Respondents were awarded

in the

64%

34%

came

sample was

13% of Tutsis had personally
of Tutsis' family members

of Hutus and

53%

of Tutsis had

conflict.

USD 2

each for their participation in the research,

4.3.2 Survey Instrument

The procedures and questionnaires were
the study participants

from

1

960s

were told

to the present.

similar to Study 2.

that the questionnaire

The questionnaire was
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was about

At

the beginning of

the conflict in Burundi

structured in the

same way

as in Study

2. First, participants

completed a

set

completed ingroup identification measures. Afterwards, they

of measures assessing their construal of the conflict

in

Burundi since

1960s. At the end they provided demographic information (age, gender, region of origin,

education, extent of victimization).

The questionnaires were administered

in French. All

items were translated by two translators equally fluent in English and French. All the
items were examined by Murundi research assistants to

make

sure that the items were

appropriately adapted to the specific context and reflected the intended meaning to people

in

Burundi.

4.3.2.1 Attributions

of Responsibility

One item each

assessed the amount of responsibility attributed to each target

group (extremist Tutsi groups, extremist Hutu groups, the Tutsi people in general, the

Hutu people

in general) separately for instigation

and for consequences of the violent

events in Burundi. All items were assessed using 6

5

= complete

-

point scales (0

= no

responsibility;

responsibility).

4.3.2.2 Legitimization of Ingroup

Harmdoing

A measure for the legitimization of past ingroup violence scale was adopted by
Noor

et al. (2008).

carried out

The

scale included four items: (1)

Most of the

violent acts that were

on behalf of my ethnic group against the other group were mainly

protection, (2)

Sometimes

my

group was

violence against the other group, (3)

left

for self-

with no other choice but to respond with

Members of my group committed

acts

of violence

because they were provoked into them by the other group, (4) Most of the violent acts
carried out

by

my group against the other group

are not justified (reversed item).

The

last

item was dropped due to low item-scale correlations. The scores of the remaining three

70

items were averaged to form a scale of justification of violence. The scale revealed very

good

reliability for

4.3.2.3 Severity

both groups (a

=

.82 for

Hutus and a = .74 for

Tutsis).

of Harm

The perceived

severity of harm measures in Study 2

harm

casualty estimates) were adapted to assess the perceived

Tutsis. In addition, in a different part

(i.e.,

economic harm and

inflicted

on Hutus and on

of the questionnaire, the degree of competitive

victimhood was assessed as an additional measure of the severity of harm. The
competitive victimhood scale was adopted by Noor et
Q

items

:

( 1 )

Over

more than other
Burundi

is

the last 40 years of conflict in Burundi,

more severe
to

for

my

my group than to other groups,

other community. Because of the

Hutus and a =

4.3.2.4 Conflict

ethnic group has not suffered

and

On

average,

(4) Overall, victims in

attention to their needs

low item-scale

The three-item competitive victimhood
.70, for

scale includes four

ethnic group than for other groups, (3)

community have not received adequate

=

my

The

ethnic groups, (2) Overall, the proportion of trauma due to the conflict in

harm has been done

(a

(2008).

al.

compared

good

my

to victims in the

correlations, the last item

scale revealed

more

reliabilities for

was dropped.
both groups

.83 for Tutsis).

Framing

The framing of conflict was assessed

in a similar

way

to

Study

2;

however

the

items were modified to the context of the conflict in Burundi. Four items assessed the

degree to which participants perceived the conflict as between Hutus and Tutsis (ethnic
conflict framing), as

between extremist groups, between the

state

and the

citizens, or

o

The content of one item from

the original scale

by Noor

et al.

"On average, the
members of my
was not included in

(2008),

areas that have been affected most by the troubles are those in which

community

live",

was

specific to the Northern Ireland conflict, so

the current study.
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it

between the
not at

all;

state

and the extremist groups. All items were assessed

in 5-point scales (0

=

4 = very much).

4.3.2.5 Ingroup Identification

The same items

as in the previous studies

national identification in Burundi.

were adapted

The procedure was

the

same

to assess ethnic

and

as in Study 2. That

is,

first,

participants completed items assessing their identification with the national group

(i.e.,

being a citizen of Burundi); then they completed a set of ingroup identification items

assessing their ethnic identification.

its

low correlation with the

One

national identification item

scale. Ethnic (a

national identification scales (a

=

.79 for

=

.83 for

Hutus and a =

was dropped due

.67 for Tutsis)

to

and

Hutus and a = .78 for Tutsis) revealed good

reliabilities.

4.4 Results

4.4.

1

Who Do Hutus and Tutsis Hold Responsible
To

test

Hypotheses

1-3, a

2 (Target group: ingroup vs. ougroup)

extremist groups vs. group as a whole)

consequences)

for the Conflict?

X 2 (Type of responsibility:

X 2 (Ethnic group membership:

Hutus

vs. Tutsis)

X 2 (Target type:

instigation vs.

mixed

ANOVA was

conducted with Target group, Target type, and Type of responsibility as within subject

and Ethnic group membership as the between subject

variables,

Supporting Hypothesis
101)

=

51.78,/?

<

.001,

2
rj

=

1,

the analysis yielded a

SE =

effect

of Target group, F(l,

.034, such that respondents of both groups attributed less

responsibility to their ingroup, both extremists

2.04,

main

factor.

.09) relative to the

outgroup

and the ingroup people

(M= 2.96, SE =

.10).

in general,

However, the

results also

yielded an unexpected interaction effect between Target group and Ethnic group
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(M=

membership

F (\,

101)

=

3.60,/?

=

.06,

2
rj

=

.034. This interaction indicated that Tutsi

participants attributed less responsibility to their ingroup

Hutu participants

(M= 2.27, SE = .12),

difference between the

outgroup,

t

(1 1 1)

t (

1 1

1 )

=

amount of responsibility

= -1 .02, p =

.3

1

.

These

2.36,

that

(M=

p=

.02.

1.84,

SE =

.13) than did

However, there was no

each group attributed to the

results are notable considering that Tutsis

were

the major perpetrator of violence for most of the conflict, since 1960s until early 1990s.

The
101)

=

results also yielded a Target

29.44,/?

<

.001,

conducted pair wise

t

2
r\

tests

=

group

.23 (see Figure 9).

X Type of responsibility interaction, F
To

clarify this interaction effect,

comparing the amount of responsibility attributed

I

for the

instigation versus the consequences of violent events. Attributions of responsibility

collapsed across type of target
for the ingroup target

(i.e.,

( 1

were

extremists and general population) to form one score

and another for the outgroup

target.

These comparisons were

conducted separately for each type of target group (ingroup

vs. outgroup). Specifically,

supporting H2a, the ingroup was perceived as less responsible for instigating the events

(M=
<

1.72,

.001.

By

SE =

.1 1)

than for their consequences

contrast, the outgroup

events

(M= 3.08, SE =

2.32,/?

=

as

more responsible

than for their consequences

for instigating the

(M= 2.83, SE= .11), /(107) =

.022 (supporting H2b).

As
target,

.1 1)

was perceived

(M= 2.33, SE= .11), f (109) = -5.98, p

predicted by Hypothesis

3,

the analysis revealed a

F(l,101)=111.85,/?<.001,^ 2 =.53, such

that both

responsibility to the general population of both groups

extremists within the groups

(M= 3.35, SE =

.09).
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(M=

main

effect of Type

of

groups attributed less
1.65,

SE =

.12) relative to the

The

results also revealed

Target group
Figure

two unexpected

X Type of target interaction, F

10). All

1,

(

effects. First, the analysis yielded a

101

)

=

4.66,

p=

.03,

2
rj

=

.044 (see

pair-wise comparisons in this interaction were significant at p

<

.002.

The

interaction indicated that the difference in the responsibility attributed to ingroup people

in general versus extremist

ingroup members

(

M D = -1.59, SE = .15) was smaller than the

difference in the responsibility attributed to outgroup people in general versus to

extremist outgroup

members

ingroup as a whole

is

also revealed a

=

.001,

2
rj

=

MD =

(

-1.79,

(M=

Type of responsibility

SE =

3.28),

.

1 1), t

4.4.

1

.

1

(M=

(106)

3.42,

results

might suggest

that the

SE =

= -1.56, p =

.

t

(107)

(M=
=

.

10)

101)

=

1

1.72,/?

viewed the general population (Tutsis and Hutus)
1.39,

4.04, p

amount of it)

responsibility (and an equal

instigation

These

X Type of target interaction, F(l,

.104, such that both groups

1.90,

.17).

perceived as more cohesive than the outgroup. Second, the results

as less responsible for the instigation

events

SE =

<

SE =

.13) than for the

consequences of

.001, but they attributed

to extremist

groups on both sides for the

and consequences of the violent events

12 (see Figure

1

more

(M =

3.28,

SE =

1 ).

Ingroup Responsibility and Legitimization of Ingroup Harmdoing

Hutus and Tutsis did not

differ in the degree to

violence carried out by the ingroup,
legitimization of violence

M= 4.42, SD =

t

was above

1.28 for Hutus

(1

1

1)

=

-.35,/?

=

which they legitimized the
.73,

however both groups'

the mid-point of the scale

(M= 4.32, SD =

1.47

and

and Tutsis respectively). To assess the subjective meaning

of ingroup responsibility, correlations were conducted between legitimization of ingroup
violence and attributions of responsibility (to the ingroup people in general and to

ingroup extremists) separately for Hutu and Tutsi respondents.
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As

the

same

pattern of

relations

emerged

the scores of the

for responsibility for the instigation as for the

consequences of events,

two types of responsibility were averaged, and the analyses were

conducted again. Overall,

I

expected a negative relation between ingroup responsibility

and legitimization of the harm. Interestingly, the more responsibility Hutu respondents
attributed to ingroup people in general the

.33,

p=

.014);

by

contrast, the

more

more they legitimized ingroup violence

(r

=

responsibility they attributed to ingroup extremists

the less they justified the ingroup violence (r

=

-.37,

p=

.005). So, for Hutus,

viewing the

ingroup people as responsible for the violence would not translate to ingroup blame

because higher responsibility

is

related to

more

legitimization, but the opposite

is

true for

ingroup extremists. For Tutsi respondents, the relationship between legitimization of
ingroup violence and ingroup attributions of responsibility was negative, but did not
reach significance, both for the ingroup people in general (r

ingroup extremists
4.4.2

(r

=

-. 1

8,

p=

.

1

I

-.11,

p=

.19)

and for

8).

Who Do Hutus and Tutsis Believe
First,

=

Suffered due to the Conflict?

assessed the perceived severity of harm inflicted upon the ingroup and

upon the outgroup. Then,

I

investigated whether Hutus and Tutsis differ in the degree to

which they endorsed competitive victimhood.

To

assess the perceived severity of harm inflicted

on each group (H4), mixed

ANO VAs were conducted for each indicator of harm, with Target group (ingroup vs.
outgroup) as the within-subject factor and participants' Ethnic group membership (Hutus
vs. Tutsis) as the

between-subject factor.

In line with predictions, across the

main

effect of Target

two indicators of harm, the

results revealed a

group such that each group perceived the harm inflicted on
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themselves as greater than the harm inflicted on the outgroup. However, there was also an

unexpected interaction between Target group and Ethnic group membership such

Hutus

harm

relative to Tutsis, perceived the

inflicted

More

harm

inflicted

on

their ingroup as greater than the

on the outgroup.

=

55.34,/?

<

.001,

2
rj

=37, such

The

and a lower percentage to be outgroup members

members

interaction,

F(l, 93) = 3.80, p =

.054,

2
rj

=

(M=

57.52%,

(M= 34.60%, SE =

analysis also revealed a marginally significant Target group

membership

effect of

that respondents estimated a

higher percentage of the casualties in the conflict to be ingroup

2. 10)

main

specifically, for casualty estimates, the analysis yielded a

Target group, F(l, 93)

SE =

that,

1

.87).

X Ethnic group

.039. Pair-wise

comparisons

conducted to clarify the interaction effect indicated that both Hutus and Tutsis perceived
their ingroup to

have suffered more than the outgroup. However, Hutus perceived that

more harm had been
3.93)

compared

inflicted

to Tutsis

(

on

their

ingroup relative to the outgroup

M D = 16.91, SE =

4.8).

(

M D = 28.92, SE =

There was no difference between

Hutus' and Tutsis' estimates of ingroup casualities and their estimates of outgroup
casualties.

Likewise, for economic harm,

(1,

110)

inflicted

=

46.37,/?

on

<

.001,

their ingroup

the outgroup

2
t]

=

.30,

ANOVA revealed a main effect of Target group, F

such that respondents perceived the economic harm

(M= 4.18, SE =

(M= 3. 19, SE =

.

13).

The

.08) as

more severe than

the

harm

analysis also yielded a Target group

group membership interaction, F(l. 110)

— 9.81, p =

.002,

rf=

inflicted

X

on

Ethnic

.082 (see Figure 12). All

pair-wise comparisons conducted to clarify the interaction effect were significant. Hutus

perceived more harm inflicted on their ingroup
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(M= 4.35, SE =

.09) than Tutsis

(M=

4.00,

SE =

.

whereas Tutsis relative

13),

(M= 3.47, SE =

greater

.17

and

to

Hutus perceived the outgroup harm

to

be

M= 2.91, SE = .19 for Tutsis and Hutus respectively).

Similar to the findings with casualty estimates measure, the difference between the

perceived harm inflicted on the ingroup relative to the outgroup was greater for Hutus

(

MD =

.44,

1

SE =

severity of harm

.20) than for Tutsis

(

MD =

.53,

SE =

.2

1 ).

This asymmetry

in

perceived

meaningful considering that Hutus have been the main target of the

is

violence between 1960s- 1993.

To

membership on competitive victimhood, an

assess the effect of ethnic group

independent sample

t

test

was conducted with

ethnic group

membership

subject factor and competitive victimhood as the dependent variable.

The

between

results revealed

both groups, the ratings of competitive victimhood were higher than the mid-

that, for

point of the scale

showing

(M= 4.15, SD =

that both

1

.43 for Hutus,

was no

Do Hutus and Tutsis Frame
test

M= 4.26, SD =

Hypothesis

5,

1

.57 for Tutsis),

to a greater

degree

difference between Hutus' and Tutsis' degree

of endorsement of competitive victimhood,

To

and

groups perceived their ingroup as being harmed

than the outgroup. However, there

4.4.3

as the

t

(1 10)

=

-.34,

p=

.73.

the Conflict Differently?

a mixed

ANOVA was conducted with four levels of

Conflict framing as the within-subject factor (state vs. citizens, state vs. extremist groups,

conflict

among

membership
framing,

extremists, conflict

as the

F (3,

303)

between subject

=

41 .29,

p<

factor.

.001

conflict primarily as ethnic clashes

to an equal extent as a conflict

between Hutus and Tutsis) and ethnic group

2
,

rj

=

ANOVA revealed a main effect of Conflict
.29,

such that respondents perceived the

between Hutus and Tutsis

among

extremist groups
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(M= 3.62, SD =

(M= 3.64, SD =

1.38).

1.48)

and

These

were followed by a perceived conflict between the

SD =

1.32)

and

The

(see Figure 13).

interaction effect

membership was not

To

Hutus and Tutsis differed
predictions, there

F (3,

significant,

Hypothesis

test

6,

in their

and extremists,

4.4.4

=

r

and

its

(102)

=

1.15,/?

{M= 2.37,

citizens (A/ = 1.93,

303) =

/

.37,

tests

p=

SD=

1.12)

.77.

were conducted

to

compare whether

endorsements of each conflict frame. Contrary to the

were no differences between Hutus and Tutsis

.82, or as a conflict

How Does

state

and extremist groups

between Conflict framing and Ethnic group

independent

any of the conflict frames: ethnic

.23,/?

between the

lastly as a conflict

state

conflict, t(

=

\

10)

=

.25, or a conflict

p=

1.58,

in their

endorsement of

.12, a conflict

between

between extremist groups,

between government and

citizens,

/

(106)

=

t

state

(106)

=

1.66,/? =.10.

Ingroup Identification Influence Hutus' and Tutsis' Construals of the

Conflict?

4.4.4.

1

Ethnic and National Identification

There was no difference between Hutus and Tutsis in the degree to which they
identified with their ethnic

group (Hutus:

1.18) or the national group (Hutus:

However,

M= 4.63, SD =

identification

t

(113)

was not

=

7.60,/?

<

.001.

The

significant for either

was stronger than

correlation

Hutus

(r

=

their ethnic

between ethnic and national
.02) or Tutsis (r

noted that national identification for both groups was very high (Ms
point scales), suggesting a ceiling effect.

identification in this study

was not

M= 4.32, SD =

M= 5.57, SD = .81; Tutsis: M= 5.47, SD = .94).

participants' national identification

identification,

1.34; Tutsis:

As noted

in the

=

=

.

19).

It

should be

5.57 and 5.47 in 6-

hypotheses section, national

a useful predictor of any of the dependent measures,
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and did not

affect the relationship

between ethnic

Therefore, national identification measure

identification

was dropped from

and dependent variables.

further analysis.

4.4.4.2 Attributions of Responsibility

The same

analytic procedure as in Study 2

was conducted

to assess the role

of

ethnic identification on construals of past conflict. Regression analyses were conducted

with ethnic group membership, ethnic identification, and their interaction as predictors.

Each

attribution of responsibility

measure served as the dependent

variable.

The

effect

of

ingroup identification was tested separately for the ingroup and outgroup measures.
Similar to the previous studies, ethnic identification

on

attributions of responsibility for the instigation

showed

same

the

pattern of effects

and for the consequences of the events.

Therefore, attribution of responsibility scores were collapsed across the two types of
responsibility for the ingroup people in general (a

(a

=

.72),

ingroup extremists (a

=

.68),

-

.61), the

outgroup people in general

and outgroup extremists (a =

.67),

and the

analyses were re-conducted with the averaged scores.

Across attributions of responsibility measures, the interaction between ethnic
group membership and ingroup identification was not significant (see Table

examine the

effect of ethnic identification separately for each

1

1).

To

group (H7a-b), regression

analyses were conducted with ethnic identification as the predictor and each attribution of

responsibility

results for

measure as the dependent measure.

each ethnic group

is

A summary of the regression analyses

presented in Table 12. Overall, the more participants

identified with their ethnic ingroup the

more

responsibility they attributed to the

outgroup. For both groups, the strength of ingroup identification
the

amount of responsibility

attributed specifically to extremist
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was not associated with

members of ingroups

or

outgroups. Unexpectedly, the

more Hutus

identified with their ethnic

group the more

responsibility they attributed to the ingroup.

4.4.4.3 Legitimization of Ingroup Violence

To

investigate the effect of ethnic identification

violence, a regression analysis

membership, and

their interaction as predictors.

of ethnic identification,/? =
ethnic group

.08.

membership

.47,

/

(109)

X ethnic

p=

(55)=

t

analysis yielded a significant effect

<

and a marginally significant

3.91,/?

(54)

=

3.84,

p<

.001,

.001.

/?

=

-.21,

/

(109)

=

=

-1.72,/?

=

to clarify the interaction effect indicated that the

more they legitimized ingroup

However, the degree

to

which Tutsis

violent

identified with

group was not associated with legitimization of ingroup violence,

1.21,/?

The

The

identified with their ethnic group, the

.46,

their ethnic

=

ethnic identification, ethnic group

identification interaction,

Simple slope analyses conducted

more Hutus
acts,

was conducted with

on legitimization of ingroup

/?

=

.16,

t

.23.

results indicated that the

more Hutus

identified with their ingroup, the

more

they legitimized the violence committed by the ingroup, but they also attributed more
responsibility to ingroup people in general.

To

clarify this puzzling result,

I

assessed

whether ingroup identification would be related to the same extent to ingroup
responsibility after controlling for legitimization of violence.

after controlling for legitimization

identification

The

results indicated that

of ingroup violence, the relationship between ingroup

and ingroup responsibility became non-significant for Hutus

did not change for Tutsis (r

=

.18).
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(r

=

.19), but

4.4.4.4 Severity of

To

test

Harm

Hypothesis

8, similar to prior

analyses, regressions were conducted with

ethnic group membership, ethnic identification and their interaction as predictors.

Each

indicator of harm served as a dependent measure in separate regression analyses. Across

indicators of harm, the interaction

membership was not

between ethnic identification and ethnic group

significant (see Table 13).

significant, simple slope analyses

Although

were conducted

to test

this interaction

was not

whether ingroup identification

might have an effect for either ethnic group. Regression analyses with ethnic
identification as the predictor

and each severity of harm indicator as the dependent

measure were conducted separately
that ethnic identification

was not associated with perceived

ingroup or the outgroup (see Table

economic harm
to less

for each ethnic group. Overall, the results indicated

14).

The only

severity of harm

significant prediction

emerged

for the

was

related

indicator, such that for Tutsis, stronger ethnic identification

economic harm perceived

to

be inflicted on the outgroup,

/?

=

on the

-.39,

t

(56)

=

-3.09,/?

<.01.
Similar analyses were conducted with competitive victimhood measure as the

dependent variable. As expected, the analyses yielded only an effect of ethnic
identification,/?

=

.34,

f

(108)

=

2.72,

p<

.01,

such that the more respondents identified

with their ethnic group the more they perceived the ingroup to have suffered more than
the outgroup.

was not

While the interaction between ethnic identification and group membership

significant,

=

-.09,

t

(108)

=

-.73,

p=

.47,

simple regression analyses conducted

separately with each group suggested that the strength of ethnic identification
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was

associated with the ratings of competitive victimhood only for Hutus,

2.97,

p=

005; but not for Tutsis,

4.4.4.5 Conflict

To

test

15.

As

=

.18, t (55) =.1 .39,

p=

.

Hypothesis

9, similar

t

(53)

=

regression analyses were conducted with each

more group members

predicted, the

ethnic conflict framing.

membership and ethnic

identification

Simple slope analysis also showed

on ethnic

.005 for Hutus, and

p=

The analyses

.39,

The

interaction

(54)

that ethnic identification

=

3.14,/?

=

conflict

presented in

between ethnic group

conflict framing

was not

was a
/?

significant.

significant predictor of

= .37, / (54) = 2.94, p =

.003 for Tutsis.

also yielded an ethnic group

on endorsement of a

showed

t

is

identified with their ethnic groups, the

ethnic conflict framing for each group considered separately,

analyses

.38,

17.

dependent variable. The summary of the results

more they endorsed an

effect

=

Framing

conflict frame as the

Table

fi

/?

between the

membership

state

and

its

X ethnic

citizens.

identification

Simple slope

that only for Tutsis, as expected, stronger ethnic identification

was

associated with perceiving the conflict less as a conflict between the state and the

citizens,

/?

=

-.36,

t

(54)

=

-2.79,

p < .01;

however, for Hutus, ethnic identification was not

associated with the endorsement of a conflict between the state and the citizens, fi=.09,t
(52)

=

.63,

p=

historically

state

.53.

Within the context of the Burundi conflict

been the ruling

elite,

as predicted, Tutsis

in

which Tutsis have

might psychologically associate the

with their ethnic group, in which case stronger ethnic identification would lead to

perceiving less conflict between the state and the citizens.
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4.5 Discussion

4.5.1

How Do

Hutus and Tutsis Construe the Interethnic Conflict

In line with the findings

from the previous two

studies,

in

Burundi?

each group assigned less

responsibility to their ingroup for the conflict than to the outgroup. Furthermore,

paralleling the findings in Study

1

and supporting

my predictions,

each group perceived

themselves as less responsible for the instigation relative to the consequences of conflict,
but perceived the outgroup as more responsible for the consequences relative to the
instigation of conflict. Additionally, replicating the findings of Study 2, regardless of

group membership, extremist groups were perceived as more responsible than ingroup

and outgroup people

in general.

Study 3 also extended the assessment of attributions of responsibility by

examining an additional variable, the legitimization of ingroup violence. One interesting
but contradictory finding

was

that for Hutus, the

amount of responsibility assigned

to

ingroup people in general and the responsibility assigned to ingroup extremists were
differentially related to legitimization

of violence. The more Hutus viewed their ingroup

extremists as responsible for the conflict, the less they justified ingroup violence;

however, the more they viewed ingroup people

more they justified ingroup
on

different

ingroup.

As

meanings when

in general responsible for the conflict, the

violence. This finding suggests that responsibility might take

it

is

associated with different subgroups within the larger

such, ingroup responsibilility does not always translate to acceptance of

accountability for the conflict. Further research

under which ingroup responsibility

is

is

necessary to examine the processes

associated with acceptance of moral accountability

for the violent acts or with increased inclination to justify ingroup violence.
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With regard
inflicted

to severity

of harm, as predicted, each group perceived the harm

on them as greater than the harm

inflicted

on the outgroup. Additionally, the

mutual perceptions of ingroup and outgroup harm were asymmetric, such that Tutsi
relative to

Hutus perceived more harm

reflect a reality constraint in the

the

main

target

inflicted

on the outgroup. This pattern might

Burundi conflict

of victimization. The

realities

in

which Hutus were

for

many decades

of the conflict were also reflected

in the

composition of the current sample in which a higher percentage of Hutu respondents as

compared

to Tutsi respondents reported that either

themselves or their families had

experienced physical violence, abuse, or had been displaced during the course of the
conflict.

However, Hutus and Tutsis did not

victimhood. In other words,

when

explicitly asked to

inflicted

on each group, both groups,

suffered

more than

the outgroup.

differ in their ratings

of competitive

compare the amount of harm

to an equal extent, perceived their ingroup to

Whether group members engage

have

in intergroup

comparisons of harm which might increase the inclination to compete with the outgroup,
or whether they reflect separately on the

harm

that each

group has suffered, might have

important implications on their responses.

With regard

to conflict framing, there

Tutsis in the degree to

were no differences between Hutus and

which they endorsed the

different conflict frames.

The hypotheses

based on Lemarchand's (1994) analysis of each group's conflict frame were not
supported. Since 1994

when Lemarchand's book was

going on in Burundi, both sides engaged

power

to

Hutu majority. This

perceptions of conflict.

The

shift in

in

published, a civil war has been

massacres, and Tutsis lost some of their

power

relations

might have led

to

more symmetric

current findings are in line with the results from focus group
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discussions that

I

conducted with Hutus and Tutsis (208 participants)

2007). Content analysis of participants' open-ended responses

causes of the conflict belonged in three main categories:
corruption, greed,

conflict),

and

power

( 1 )

in

showed

Burundi

(Bilali,

that perceptions

the leaders

(i.e.,

of

leaders'

struggles), (2) ethnic divisions (e.g., ethnic hatred, a history of

(3) social conditions (e.g., poverty, difficult life conditions). Overall,

similar to the results of the current study, there

were no differences between Hutus and

Tutsis in the perceived causes of the conflict.

4.5.2

The Role of Ethnic

One

Identification

on Construals of the Past

important goal of this study was to assess whether individual differences in

the strength of ingroup identification play a role on group

members' construals of the past

under conditions of ongoing conflict and violence. The strength of ingroup identification

was associated with more

responsibility attributed to the outgroup as a whole, to higher

ratings of competitive victimhood, increased legitimization of ingroup violence,

and

higher endorsement of an ethnic conflict frame. The strength of ingroup identification

was not associated with

the

amount of responsibility

of in- and outgroup) and neither was

The
attributions,

it

attributed to extremist groups (both

associated with perceived severity of harm.

relationship of ingroup identification with outgroup rather than ingroup

might

reflect the nature

violence between Hutus and Tutsis.

of deep prejudices embedded

The

in a

long history of

contradicting finding that, for Hutus, stronger

ingroup identification was related to more responsibility attributed to their ingroup was
clarified

When

when

taking into account the role of the legitimization of ingroup violence.

controlling for legitimization of ingroup violence, the relationship between ingroup

identification

and ingroup responsibility became non-significant. However,
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why more

ingroup responsibility was associated with higher ingroup legitimization (rather than

lower legitimization) needs more scrutinizing. Overall, Hutus placed very
responsibility to their ingroup.

It is

little

possible that for a victimized group such as the Hutus,

the positive relation between ingroup identification

and ingroup responsibility might be a

manifestation of perceiving the ingroup as an active agent in the conflict.

Ingroup identification was not associated with perceived severity of harm inflicted

on each group separately, but was related

to higher ratings

of competitive victimhood for

Hutus only. The use of these different approaches raises important questions regarding
the relation between ingroup identification and perceived severity of harm.

Does

the

strength of ingroup identification drive intergroup comparison of severity of harm, thus

leading to competition over suffering; or alternatively, does ingroup identification

independently affect perceived harm inflicted on each group

and higher ingroup harm)? According
suffered

more than

(i.e.,

lower outgroup harm

to the latter view, the belief that the ingroup has

the outgroup should be a by-product of this process. Future research

should investigate the use of these different approaches and examine potential
implications that each might have for intergroup outcomes.
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CHAPTER

5

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The

three studies reported here investigated

intergroup conflict in which the ingroup
identification with the ingroup

is

is

how group members

involved, and

how the

construe past

strength of

associated with these construals. Based on prior

intergroup conflict and social psychology literature,

I

identified

and assessed three

dimensions along which construals of conflict might vary. These included attributions of
responsibility, severity of harm,

and conflict framing. Attributions of responsibility and

perceived severity of harm accounted for variations in construals of the violent events,

whereas conflict framing assessed whether groups

in conflict

have similar understanding

of the core issues involved.

Within social psychology, the study of "historical memories" of conflict has
received only minimal attention

acknowledgment

that

(e.g.,

Liu

et al.,

blaming the adversary and perceived victimhood play a negative

role in perpetuation of the cycles of conflict,

assessed

harm

how group members

inflicted

is

no research

assign responsibility or

that

I

am

how they

aware

of,

has actually

estimate the severity of

on each group. While disciplines such as sociology, anthropology or

political sciences enrich

leadership,

& Ross, 2007). Despite an

1999; Sahdra

and other

our understanding of the role that media, history textbooks,

societal factors in shaping shared representations

not clear what factors, at the individual level, drive group

narratives while rejecting others. In the current research,

I

members

of the

conflict,

to endorse

some

adopted a social identity

perspective as a suitable framework for this investigation. This framework gives the
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it

opportunity to examine

group, that

is,

how

phenomena

at the interaction

individuals act and think as group members.

contexts of intergroup conflicts and violence

group members are attached

The

findings

between the individual and the

showed

to their

that regardless

I

ingroups

investigated

is

how

By

using real world

the degree to

which

associated with construals of the conflict.

of the status of the group

(e.g.,

majority vs. minority;

victim vs. perpetrator), the temporal distance to the conflict (past vs. ongoing conflict),
the strength of societal narratives (strong governmental narratives or

individual level characteristics

Understanding

no public debates),

were an important predictor of construals of the

how and why group members

memories of some events while forgetting

interpret conflicts in certain

conflict.

ways and

others, should be important to find

ways

retain

to

address the underlying needs and motives that give rise to these differential construals.

Below,

I

discuss the

main findings of the current research and highlight avenues

to future research in this area.

5.1

Who Do People

5.1.1 Targets

Hold Responsible

for Intergroup Conflicts?

of Attributions

Across the three studies participants exhibited ingroup favoritism

in attributions

of responsibility. Particularly, they assigned less responsibility to their ingroup, but more
responsibility to the outgroup

and to the external factors (such as

circumstances), regardless of whether the ingroup

Armenian genocide) or a victim
the Burundi conflict).

While

it

is

(e.g.,

Kurds

was

in the

third parties or external

a perpetrator (e.g., Turks in the

Turkish-Kurdish conflict, or Hutus in

generally acknowledged that each group blames the

outgroup for the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007), only few studies have actually assessed the

amount of responsibility

that

group members assign
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to

each party

in contexts

of

intergroup conflict (for an example see Doosje, Zebel, Scheermeijer,

&

Mathyi, 2007).

Two

findings were notable. First, across studies, respondents of each group assigned

some

responsibility to the ingroup for the conflict suggesting that denial of ingroup

responsibility

is

not contingent upon the overall

amount of responsibility assigned

to the

ingroup, but upon the comparison of ingroup and outgroup responsibility. Second, group

members assigned

substantial responsibility to third parties

the conflict (Studies

1

and

2).

For instance,

in the

Turks attributed equal amount of responsibility
situational factors) as to the

and other external factors

for

Turkish -Armenian conflict context,

to external factors

(i.e.,

third parties

and

outgroup (the Armenians), and equal amount of

responsibility for the consequences of conflict to the external factors as to the ingroup.

Similarly, in the second study, both Turks

third parties than to Turkish

and Kurds assigned more responsibility

and Kurdish people. Prior

literature (e.g.,

suggests that attributions of responsibility to external factors tone
responsibility for the conflict. This

groups which

may need

however,

it

not clear

assign as

much

who

did not

is

argument

to justify ingroup's

why

down

ingroup'

its

privileged position,

minority or victim groups such as Kurds in Turkey would

violent acts might

still

May

(1987) argues that people or groups

be responsible

(a)

encouraged violence, (b) helped cultivate the conditions for

it

prevent the negative occurrences (see also Lickel, Schmader,

factors

Bandura, 1999)

plausible for majority or perpetrator

harmdoing actions or

responsibility to third parties.

commit

is

to

might also be important to understand

parties.
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why groups

because they might have
to occur, or (c) they did not

& Hamilton, 2003). These

assign responsibility to third

The

role

of third parties

in ethnic conflict, especially in conflict intervention,

Balch-Lindsay

been widely investigated by

political scientists (e.g.,

Fisher, 2001, Regan, 2002).

The current research suggests

situational factors play an important role in

evolution of conflict.

&

Enterline, 2000;

and

that third parties

group members' beliefs about

The study of intergroup

has

initiation

and

conflict, especially within social

psychology, focuses on the factors related either to the ingroup or the outgroup. Lay
perceptions about the role of third parties and situational factors might influence the

dynamics of conflict. These

might either exacerbate conflict or provide a potential

beliefs

for resolution. Understanding the conditions that give rise to violence, such as the role

of

economics, ideologies, history (Staub, 1989), and even third parties, might lead group

members

to

making

less dispositional attributions to the outgroup. In other

words,

considering the role of factors that foster conditions for violence to occur, might lead to

viewing the adversary as "less

evil",

which

might open avenues for reconciliation.

in turn

5.1.2 Attributing Responsibility to Extremists vs. the General Population

The

current research

went beyond ingroup

different types of targets within in-

vs.

outgroup distinctions to assessing

and outgroup, such as

or general population (Studies 2 and 3). Both studies

institutions, extremist groups,

showed

that people distinguish the

general population from the extremist groups or institutions. Overall, group

attributed less responsibility to their ingroup,

institutions or ingroup extremists to

the

mechanisms

vs. general

that lead

however they

members

also perceived the ingroup

be more responsible than outgroup people. However,

group members

to attribute responsibility to extremist

population are not yet understood.

provide alternate predictions.
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Two

groups

research literatures are relevant but

On

one hand, research on the 'black sheep' effect (Abrams, Marques, Bown,

& Yzerbyt,

Marques

Dougill, 2002;

&

1988) suggests that group members are motivated to

exclude undesirable ingroup members from the representation of the ingroup (Eidelman,

Silvia,

&

Biernet, 2006),

identity. In addition,

which

in turn helps maintain

group members, especially high

and enhance a positive group

identifiers, are

more motivated

to

include outgroup deviants in the representation of the outgroup in order to establish a
positive distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup (Abrams, Marques, Randsley

de Moura, Hutchison,

According

& Bown, 2004;

to this view,

Hutchison, Abrams, Gutierrez,

group members might be motivated

to

& Viki, 2008).

view the ingroup

extremists as deviants, whereas they view the outgroup extremists as typical

members of

the outgroup.

On the
and

threat

research

other hand, the intergroup conflict literature suggests that intense conflict

enhances group unity and solidarity (Pettigrew, 2003). For example, some

(e.g.,

Rothgerber, 1997) shows that a threat to the ingroup enhances perceptions

of similarity and
conflict,

groups

common

fate within the group.

who would

As

such, under conditions of intense

be perceived as "extremists" by the outgroup might be

perceived as the "heroes" and advocates

among members of the

conditions are ingroup extremists perceived as "heroes" and

deviants? Further research

is

ingroup.

when

Under what

are they perceived as

necessary to investigate the mechanisms that lead to such

different outcomes.

5.1.3 Responsibility for Instigation vs.

I

Consequences of Conflict

distinguished two types of responsibility, responsibility for the instigation versus

the consequences of the events. Studies

1

and 3 supported the hypotheses

91

that

groups

engage

in a

competition over 'who started the conflict'. This competition

group members

to attribute less responsibility to the

the consequences of the conflict,

in turn drives

ingroup for the instigation than for

and might lead the outgroup

to

be perceived as more

responsible for the instigation than for the consequences of the conflict. These patterns of

attributions reveal

embedded

how justification

in the construals

of ingroup's harmdoing or denial of responsibility

and representations of the

conflict.

These representations

might be either post-hoc explanations of events or justifications
premises that the outgroup

The
attributions

is

an attack on

to carry

dangerous.

current findings suggest that each group might focus on different types of

when

addressing each party's responsibility in the conflict. For example, to

deflect their responsibility, perpetrator groups might be

responsibility for the instigation of the acts;

harm and

is

suffering inflicted

consequences of the

more motivated

whereas victims, being preoccupied with the

upon them, might focus on the

conflict. If

on the

to focus

responsibility for the

each group emphasizes different aspects of events, any

discussion on responsibility of the conflict

would be unproductive.

Overall, people's lay judgments on attributions of responsibility should be

investigated

more systematically

in order to reach a better understanding

of the

motivational factors that lead to differential attributions of responsibility. In addition, the
current research demonstrated that

from accepting
needed

liability or

acknowledgement of responsibility might be

different

blameworthiness for the harmdoing. As such, more research

to differentiate these

phenomena

at

an intergroup
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level.

is

5.2

Who Do

People Believe Suffered during Conflict?

With regard
translate to

of harm,

to severity

more harm perceived

to

I

suggested that ingroup favoritism would

be inflicted on the ingroup than on the outgroup.

Why would groups attempt to portray themselves as victims?
human

rights

have become more important

in international relations,

legitimacy and entitlement due to past injustices (Moscovici

of the victim has become desirable as
reparations,

and other policies

suffering inflicted

it

In the last

two decades, as

victims have gained

& Perez, 2006). The status

attracts international aid, legitimacy, the right to

that attempt to help victim

groups to deal with the past

upon them.

Comparisons of the amount of harm

inflicted

on the ingroup and the outgroup

yielded different results across the three studies presented here. For example, Turkish

respondents reported that Armenians have suffered more than Turks during the Turkish-

Armenian

conflict at the beginning of 20th century; Turkish respondents perceived equal

amount of harm

to

be inflicted on Turks and Kurds during the Turkish-Kurdish

whereas Kurds perceived

their

conflict,

ingroup to have suffered more; similarly, Hutus and Tutsis

perceived the respective ingroups to have suffered more during the conflict. Overall, the

ingroup favoritism hypothesis was supported only partially. These results however should
not be interpreted in isolation, but should take into account the social realities of each

context under study. Social reality characteristics might constrain the degree to which

group members exhibit ingroup favoritism (Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs,

&

Simons,

1997). For example, within stereotype literature, considerable research (Brewer

Campbell, 1976; Eagly

& Kite,

1987; Linssen

& Hagendoorn,

&

1994) has found the

content of stereotypes to be influenced by social reality features. Ellemers, Spears,
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&

Doosje (2002) claim that different response patterns should be understood by taking into
considerations different goals and motives in combination with different contextual

factors. Similarly, in the context

the degree to

that

for

of current studies, social reality features might constrain

which ingroup favoritism

Turkey engaged

in large scale

is

manifested. For example, taking into account

massacres toward Armenians,

it

might not be feasible

Turks to completely deny the harm inflicted on Armenians; the harm can only be

minimized

to a certain

degree for the claims to be believable. Additionally,

it

should be

noted that the amount of harm reported was in line with the Turkish group narrative.
Similarly, in Study 2, Turkish respondents perceived the

Kurds

to

be equal. These perceptions

terrorism issue,

which

fit

inflicted

on Turks and on

the broader ingroup's framing of the conflict as a

in turn denies the oppression

members' judgments of perceived

harm

of minority

rights. Overall,

severity of harm should be evaluated

group

by taking into

account the broader context of the conflict. Although groups might be inclined to portray

themselves as the victims in the conflict, the extent to which

this goal

can be achieved

is

constrained by social context.

5.3

The Role of Conflict Frames
Each group

is

likely to endorse an ingroup favoring

framing might be essential as
are interpreted.

As

affects processing

in Intergroup Conflict

it

frame of the

conflict. Conflict

provides the lenses through which the conflictual events

such, conflict framing might function as a master

schema which

of relevant information. Conflict framing might have important

implications especially in asymmetric conflicts. Each group in a conflict might endorse a

different framing, thus inhibiting opportunities for a

common understanding

of the issues

involved. For example, different conflict frames might lead to different interpretations of
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the conflictual events (e.g., attributions of responsibility) and to endorsement of different

conflict resolution strategies (e.g., fighting terrorists vs. granting minority rights).

Therefore, the antecedents and consequences of endorsing different conflict frames

should be further explored.
5.4

How Does

Ingroup Identification Influence Construals of Past Conflict?

Across the three studies, the strength of ingroup identification was associated with
ingroup favoritism

in attributions

The

to third parties.

of responsibility to the ingroup, the outgroup, as well as

current findings indicated that the strength of ingroup identification

was associated with both ingroup and outgroup
in

which the strength of Hutus' and

Tutsis' ethnic identification

consistently with outgroup responsibility. Research

different processes

1999).

identification

might differentially

threat

relate to

exception was Study 3

was associated more

on ingroup bias suggests

might determine ingroup preference

Under conditions of extreme

One

attributions.

vs.

that

outgroup evaluation (Brewer,

and violence, the strength of ingroup
ingroup and outgroup aspects of ingroup bias.

For instance, the correlation between ingroup identification and outgroup prejudice has

been shown
threat

to

be high

in the

presence of intergroup conflict (Brewer, 1999). Heightened

might weaken the relationship between the strength of ingroup identification and

ingroup aspects

(e.g.,

with outgroup aspects

The

ingroup preference) of ingroup bias, while strengthening

(e.g.,

relationship

less straightforward.

identification

and perceived severity of harm was

strength of ethnic identification

perceived harm in Studies

1

relation

outgroup derogation) of ingroup bias.

between ethnic

The

its

and

2,

but

it

was associated with Turks'

was not associated with Kurds', or with Hutus'

and Tutsis' perceived harm. Ingroup favoritism hypothesis postulated
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that as

group

members

are motivated to think positively about themselves

and

their groups, they

would

be more inclined to minimize the harm inflicted on the outgroup, while perceiving the
ingroup as the victim. These predictions are most appropriate
considered to be the perpetrator.

It is

less clear

why

among members of victimized groups would show
of harm.

It is

when

the ingroup

is

the strength of ingroup identification

different patterns in perceived

possible that for victim groups the extent of harm suffered by the ingroup

salient regardless

victimization events

is less

evident.

better understand biases that

memory of

New theoretical perspectives might be

members of minority

necessary to

or victimized groups might manifest in

perceived harm inflicted upon them and the outgroup.

It is

possible that

members of

perpetrator and victim groups might have different underlying motives and needs

differential interpretations

of construals of conflict. For example, while

investigated the strength of ingroup identification,

which individuals might
subjective

is

of the strength of ingroup identification. Sahdra and Ross (2007) also

noted that the link between the strength of ingroup identification and

produce

amount

I

did not assess the different

relate to the ingroup or the content

meaning of group

identity).

of their identity

which

I

ways

(i.e.,

in

the

Identification with different types of groups (e.g.,

victim vs. perpetrator) might give rise to different needs and concerns beyond

maintaining a positive view of the ingroup. Identifying and understanding the underlying

mechanisms, needs, and motives,

that

might have an influence

in differential construals

of conflict would provide important insights into understanding
are perpetuated.
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how

cycles of violence

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION
Burundi, Turkey and other societies that have experienced violent conflicts face
important decisions regarding

article in the

how to

peace agreement signed

deal with their violent history. For example, an

in

Burundi by

all

(Arusha Peace and

parties

Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in 2000), called for clarification of "the entire
history of Burundi, going as far back as possible in order to inform Burundi about their

past.

The purpose of this

Burundians can interpret

clarification shall

it

in the

be

to rewrite

same way" (Protocol

Burundi's history, so that

1,

Article 8,

How can a shared interpretation be achieved when groups
clear differences in construals of the conflict? Furthermore,

achieved and accountability for the past be established

the

c).

in a conflict exhibit

how can truth and justice

be

when groups endorse such

different interpretations of the past? Within the reconciliation

literature, there is

all

and

conflict resolution

an acknowledgement that without addressing the past, acknowledging

harm done, and constructing

a shared

memory,

it

will not be possible to achieve

peaceful relations between groups. For example, reconciliation efforts around the world

have adopted programs such as truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs)
address and deal with the past as a

way

2004), and noted the lack of empirical evidence in this domain

(e.g.,

Mendeloff, 2004). In order to deal with these issues in an effective

how

aim

to

to reconstruct the future (Lederach, 1997).

However, researchers have questioned the efficacy of these measures

understand

that

(e.g.,

Barsalow, 2008;

way

groups and their members construe their conflicts and
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Gibson,

it

is

important to

how they come

to

different understandings of the past.

Understanding the factors that lead

to different

construals and interpretations might be important to inform effective strategies to change

them. The current research attempted to contribute to this understanding.
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CHAPTER

7

TABLES

Table

1.

Regression Analyses with Ingroup (Turkish) Identification as a Predictor of

Attributions of Responsibility on Each Target

Group (Study

1).

Ingroup Identification

B

SE B

(3

R2

df

Ingroup (Turks)

-.65

.10

-.53***

.29

108

Outgroup (Armenians)

.58

.09

.52***

.27

109

External factors

.46

.10

.42***

.17

108

Ingroup (Turks)

-.60

.10

_.4g***

.23

108

Outgroup (Armenians)

.49

.12

.36***

.13

109

External factors

.41

.12

.10

108

Attributions of responsibility

Instigation

Consequences

*

<05, ** <

.01,

*** < .001

99

.31***

Table

2.

Regression Analyses with Ingroup (Turkish) Identification as a Predictor oF

Each Severity of Harm Indicator (Study

1).

Ingroup Identification

B

SE B

p

R2

.23

.10

.24*

.06

91

Displaced (1915)

.28

.10

.33**

.11

72

Casualties (1915)

.24

.10

.26*

.07

74

-.25

.10

-.26*

.07

92

Displaced (1915)

-.41

.16

-.29**

.09

73

Casualties (1915)

-.38

.12

-.36***

.13

75

Severity of harm

df

Ingroup harm
Overall

harm

Outgroup harm
Overall

* <.05, **

<

harm

.01,

*** < .001
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3. Means and Standard Deviations of Responsibility for the Instigation and
Consequences of Conflict Attributed to Each Target Group (Study 2).

Table

Attributions of Responsibility

Target of responsibility

Instigation

Consequences

M

SD

M

SD

Participants of Turkish origin

The

State

2.90

1.86

3.00

1.82

The

PKK

5.29

1.39

5.43

1.19

Turks

2.21

1.61

2.14

1.49

Kurds

2.95

1.82

2.86

1.74

Third parties

4.46

1.50

4.29

1.58

Participants of Kurdish origin

The

state

5.03

1.50

4.96

1.57

The

PKK

2.85

2.16

3.31

1.97

Turks

2.59

1.68

2.46

1.70

Kurds

1.19

1.41

1.38

1.52

Third parties

3.43

2.12

3.42

2.11
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Table

4.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic Identification, Ethnic Group Membership, and

on Each Target of Attribution Measure,
Attribution (Instigation vs. Consequences) (Study 2).
their Interaction

after Collapsing

B

SE B

Ethnic group

2.06

.02

.49***

10.55

Ethnic identification

-.70

.07

-.55***

-10.47

.94

.13

.37***

7.02

Ethnic group

-2.18

.19

-.56***

-11.69

Ethnic identification

.34

.06

.29***

5.38

-.71

.13

-.31***

-.5.56

Ethnic group

.27

.21

.08

1.29

Ethnic identification

-.16

.07

-.16*

-2.30

.46

.14

.23***

3.25

Ethnic group

-1.66

.21

-.43***

-7.73

Ethnic identification

.28

.07

.24***

3.86

-.33

.15

Target of attribution

The

t

R2

state

Ethnic group

The

p

Across Type of

X

identification

.46

PKK

Ethnic group

X identification

.42

Turks

Ethnic group

X identification

.05

Kurds

Ethnic group

X

identification

continues on the next page
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-.14*

-2.22

.22

Target of attribution

B

SEB

-1.12

.24

-.28***

-4.69

.28

.08

.23***

3.47

-.27

.16

p

t

Third parties
Ethnic group

Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

* <.05, **

<

X

.01,

identification

*** < .001
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-.11

-1.64
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Table

6.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic Identification, Ethnic Group Membership, and

their Interaction as Predictors

of each Severity of Harm Indicator (Study

B

Type of harm

SE B

2).

p

t

Ingroup harm

Economic harm
Ethnic group

.97

.16

.35***

6.09

Ethnic identification

.19

.05

.23***

3.52

-.14

.11

Ethnic group

18.46

2.64

39***

6.99

Ethnic identification

4.62

.89

.33***

5.18

-3.46

1.83

-.12+

-1.87

Ethnic group

-1.09

.22

..29***

-4.98

Ethnic identification

-.26

.07

..23***

-3.49

-.02

.15

-.01

-.11

Ethnic group

X identification

-.08

-1.27

Casualty estimates (percentages)

Ethnic group

X identification

Outgroup harm

Economic harm

Ethnic group

X identification

Casualty estimates (percentages)

Ethnicgroup

-16.19 2.55

-.36***

-6.35

Ethnic identification

-4.96

.86

-.37***

-5.76

3.85

1.77

Ethnic group

X identification
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.14*

2.18

Table

and

7.

Regression Analyses with National Identification, Ethnic Group Membership,

their Interaction as Predictors

of Responsibility Attributed to each Target Group,

Collapsing across Attribution Type (Instigation vs. Consequences) (Study

2).

B

SE B

Ethnic group

.38

.13

.20*

2.88

National identification

-.68

.08

-.60***

-9.12

.09

.08

.07

1.18

Ethnic group

-.66

.14

-.34***

-4.88

Ethnic identification

.53

.08

.46***

6.88

.02

.08

.02

.31

Ethnic group

-.01

.16

-.01

-.06

National identification

-. 1

.09

-.18*

-1.94

.07

.09

.07

Ethnic group

-.46

.14

..27***

-3.27

National identification

.37

.08

.36***

4.53

.08

.08

.07

1.01

Target of attribution

The

t

state

Ethnic group

The

p

X identification

PKK

Ethnic group

X

identification

Turks

Ethnic group

X identification

.83

Kurds

Ethnic group

X

identification

Third parties

continues on the next page

107

Target of attribution

Ethnic group

National identification
Ethnic group

* <.05,

X

identification

** < .01, ***

<

B

SE B

-.19

.18

.38

.10

-.05

.10

.001

108

p

-.09

.33***

-.04

t

-1.04

3.67

-.47

Table

and

8.

Regression Analyses with National Identification, Ethnic Group Membership,

their Interaction as Predictors

of each Severity of Harm Indicator (Study

2).

B

SE B

Ethnic group

.44

.10

39***

439

National identification

.07

.06

.11

1.23

-.20

.06

-.25***

-3.52

7.97

1.76

.39***

4 54

.57

.99

.05

.58

-4.80

.99

-.34***

-4.83

-.45

.16

-.25**

-2.76

.04

.09

.03

.39

.42

.09

32***

4.48

Ethnic group

-7.39

1.68

-.37***

-4.40

National identification

-1.01

.95

-.09

-1.07

5.26

.95

Type of harm

Ingroup harm

Economic harm

Ethnic group

X identification

Casualty estimates (percentages)
Ethnic group
National identification
Ethnic group

X identification

Outgroup harm

Economic harm
Ethnic group

National identification
Ethnic group

X identification

Casualty estimates (percentages)

Ethnic group

X identification

109

.38***

5.53

Table

9.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic Identification, Ethnic Group Membership, and

their Interaction as Predictors

of Endorsement of each Conflict Frame (Study

2).

B

SE B

Ethnic group

-.55

.14

_.24***

Ethnic identification

.12

.05

.18*

.07

.10

.05

-.98

.17

-.35***

-5.97

.19

.06

.23***

3.41

-.19

.11

-.11

Ethnic group

1.19

.18

Ethnic identification

-.19

.06

.45

.12

Ethnic group

-.21

.18

Ethnic identification

.17

.06

.20**

2.82

.13

.12

.07

1.02

Conflict framing

PKK vs.

State

Ethnic group

PKK vs.

X

identification

-4.03

2.60

.70

citizens (Terrorism frame)

Ethnic group
Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

X identification

-1.68

State vs. citizens (Minority issue)

Ethnic group

Turks

vs.

X identification

Kurds (Ethnic

Ethnic group

X

.38***
-.20**

.24***

6.72
-3.17

3.70

conflict)

identification
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-.07

-1.16
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Table

1

1.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic Identification, Ethnic Group Membership and

their Interaction as Predictors

of Attributions of Responsibility (Study

3).

Ingroup identification

Target of responsibility

B

SEB

p

t

R2

-.16

.24

-.06

-.68

.065

.38

.16

-.18

.24

-.09

Ethnic group

-.63

.24

-.25** -2.70

Ethnic identification

-.19

.16

-.15

-1.22

.39

.24

.20

1.63

Ethnic group

.38

.29

.12

1.30

Ethnic identification

.51

.20

.32**

2.61

.10

.29

.04

.19

.18

Ingroup targets
Ingroup people in general
Ethnic group
Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

X Identification

.29*

2.34
-.77

Ingroup extremists

Ethnic group

X identification

.08

Outgroup targets
Outgroup people

in general

Ethnic group

X Identification

.13

.34

Outgroup extremists
Ethnic group

continues on the next page

112

.10

1.03

.03

Ingroup identification

Target of responsibility

Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

* <.05, **

<

.01,

X

identification

B

SEB

.09

.13

.09

.68

.12

.19

.08

.63

*** < .001

113

P

t

R

2

Table

12.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic Identification as a Predictor of Attributions of

Responsibility Separately for Hutus and Tutsis (Study

Target of Responsibility

3).

Ethnic identification

SEB

p

.37

.16

.31*

2.38

.10

-.19

.14

-.19

-1.37

.03

The general population

.51

.19

.34**

2.65

.12

Extremist groups

.08

.13

.65

0

B

R2

t

Hutu participants
Ingroup

The general population
Extremist groups

Outgroup

.09

Tutsi participants

Ingroup

The general population

.19

.18

.14

1.06

.02

Extremist groups

.19

.19

.13

1.00

.02

The general population

.62

.22

.35**

2.79

.12

Extremist groups

.21

.13

.20

1.55

.04

Oiitprnun

* <.05, **

<

.01,

*** < .001
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Table

and

13.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic identification, Ethnic Group Membership,

their Interaction as Predictors

of Perceived Severity of Harm (Study

Target of responsibility

3).

Ethnic identification

B

SEB

p

t

R

-.35

.16

-.21*

-2.17

.04

.02

.11

.03

.20

.002

.16

.001

Ethnic group

-5.70

4.2

-.14

-1.35

Ethnic identification

-1.16

2.78

-.06

-.42

4.4

.15

1.16

2

Ingroup harm

Economic harm
Ethnic group
Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

X Identification

.01

Casualty estimates (percentage)

Ethnic group

X identification

5.09

.003

Outgroup harm

Economic harm
Ethnic group

.49

.25

.18*

1.97

Ethnic identification

-.53

.17

-.38**

-3.06

.43

.25

.21

6.05

3.78

.17

Ethnic group

X Identification

.12

1.68

Casualty estimates (percentage)
Ethnic group

continues on the next page
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1.60

.05

Target of responsibility

Ethnic identification

Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

* <.05,

**

X

identification

B

SEB

p

t

-1.62

2.48

-.09

-.65

-1.35

3.93

-.05

-.34

< .01, *** < .001
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R2

Table

14.

Regression Analyses with Ethnic Identification as a Predictor of each Indicator

of Perceived

Harm Conducted

Separately for Hutu and Tutsi Participants (Study

Target of harm

Ethnic Identification

t

R

.04

.25

.001

2.60

-.06

-.45

.004

.02

.14

.02

.17

.001

3.93

3.65

.16

1.08

.03

Economic harm

-.53

.17

-.39** -3.09

Casualty estimates (percentage)

-1.62

2.13

-.11

-.76

.01

Economic harm

-.10

.19

-.07

-.52

.06

Casualty estimates (percentage)

-2.96

3.46

-.13

-.86

.02

B

SE

Economic harm

.02

.09

Casualty estimates (percentage)

-1.16

Economic harm
Casualty estimates (percentage)

p

2

Hutu participants
Ingroup harm

Outgroup harm

Tutsi participants

Ingroup harm
.15

Outgroup harm

* <.05,

**

<

.01,

*** < .001
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3).

Table

15.

The

Interaction

Effect of Ethnic Identification, Ethnic

on Conflict Framing (Study

conflict

among

B

t

-.05

.27

-.02

-.17

Ethnic identification

.06

.14

.06

.42

-.01

.27

-.006

-.05

conflict

X

identification

between government and citizens

Ethnic identification
Ethnic group

conflict

X

identification

-.38

.21

-.17+

-1.82

.08

.11

.09

.68

-.48

.21

-.29*

-2.32

between government and extremist groups

Ethnic group

-.35

.26

-.13

-1.34

Ethnic identification

-.07

.14

-.07

-.50

-.23

.26

-.12

-.90

-.11

-1.19

Ethnic group

A

(3

Ethnic group

Ethnic group

A

SE B

extremist groups

Ethnic group

A

their

3).

Type of harm

A

Group Membership, and

conflict

X

identification

between Hutus and Tutsis (ethnic

conflict)

Ethnic group

-.31

.26

Ethnic identification

.38

.14

.15

.26

Ethnic group

X

identification
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.33**

-.11

2.79
-1.20
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Figure 8. National Identification Predicts Turks' and Kurds' Estimates of Ingroup and
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